COMMENT

THE ROAD TO TRANSPORTATION JUSTICE: REFRAMING
AUTO SAFETY IN THE SUV AGE

JOHN F. SAYLOR†
For the past fifty years, a singular focus on consumer protection has persistently
prevented auto-safety regulators from addressing serious external hazards created by
dangerous automobile designs.
Traﬃc violence is the second leading cause of death by injury in the United States.
Beyond physical injury, traﬃc violence limits mobility and sends a powerful message
about who does and does not belong on our streets. This toll is not unleashed at
random; SUVs and pickups represent a disproportionate danger to other road users,
particularly pedestrians and drivers of ordinary passenger cars. What’s more, the
resulting traﬃc violence disproportionately burdens women, people of color, and lowincome communities. The result is a mounting crisis that threatens the safety and
equity of our transportation system.
Despite growing criticism, federal auto-safety regulators at the National Highway
Traﬃc Safety Administration (NHTSA) have yet to meaningfully respond to this
crisis. The roots of this failure are deep. Drawing on original research, this Comment
establishes that the exact design risks of SUVs and pickups that have contributed to
our current crisis have been known to federal regulators since the mid-1970s. From
its inception until the mid-1990s, NHTSA repeatedly attempted to issue regulations
that could have addressed the enormous risks that SUVs and pickup trucks pose to
other road users—but without success.
NHTSA’s historic and ongoing failure is a product of a fundamentally consumerprotectionist vision of road safety. Over the past fifty years, federal policymakers have
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centered the automobile purchaser as the appropriate beneficiary of auto-safety policy,
regulating automobile safety primarily for the people inside them with little regard for
equity or negative externalities for other road users.
Informed by this history, this Comment argues for a dramatic reframing of autosafety policy, from one focused on consumer protectionism to an equity-oriented,
distributional approach grounded in principles of transportation justice. This
approach will finally align auto-safety scholarship and policy with trends in the
distinct, but closely intertwined, field of transportation planning to advance a unified
vision for road safety.
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INTRODUCTION
In February 2003, Senator John McCain, Chairman of the Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, convened a hearing
to address troubling allegations that sport utility vehicles (SUVs) and pickup
trucks were unsafe.1 This was a serious concern: SUVs and pickups (together,
“light trucks”2) represented the largest segment of new-vehicle sales at the
1 SUV Safety: Issues Relating to the Safety and Design of Sport Utility Vehicles, Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Com., Sci. & Transp., 108th Cong. 1 (2003) [hereinafter 2003 SUV Safety Hearing].
2 Neither “SUV” nor “pickup truck” is an oﬃcial category in NHTSA’s safety regulations;
instead, automobiles are generally divided into passenger cars or “multipurpose passenger vehicles,”
deﬁned as an automobile “designed to carry 10 persons or less which is constructed either on a truck
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time, having outsold passenger cars every year since 1999.3 The preceding
year saw a national scandal involving defective tires on the rollover-prone
Ford Explorer and an explosive PBS Frontline report on SUV safety.4 Worse
still were remarks by the nation’s top auto-safety regulator, National Highway
Traﬃc Safety Administration (NHTSA) Administrator Dr. Jeﬀrey Runge,
that had set oﬀ a ﬁrestorm of media attention just a month before. In an oﬀscript interview following a speech at the Automotive News World Congress,
Dr. Runge told reporters he would not let his daughter drive an SUV “if it
was the last one on earth.”5
At the hearing, senators heard Dr. Runge and auto-safety advocate Joan
Claybrook (herself a former NHTSA Administrator) identify two principal
dangers of light trucks: rollovers and crash incompatibility, each responsible
for roughly 2,000 deaths every year.6 The rollover threat, a consequence of
light trucks’ high centers of gravity, mainly endangers the vehicle’s
occupants.7 In contrast, crash incompatibility (the danger created when two
vehicles of diﬀerent size and weight, such as an SUV and a sedan, collide) is
an externalized harm, and overwhelmingly endangers those outside the
vehicle. Dr. Runge presented data to the committee that in head-on impacts
between pickup trucks and cars, car occupants were 6.2 times more likely to
die than those in the pickup, and 26 times more likely to die in a side impact.8
Crucially, the committee also heard that consumers were purchasing light
trucks for their perceived safety advantages; and aside from the rollover risk,
light trucks indeed oﬀered substantially more protection to their occupants.9
As the president of the Insurance Institute of Highway Safety warned the
chassis or with special features for occasional oﬀ-road operation” (encompassing SUVs and pickup
trucks) and passenger cars. 49 C.F.R. § 571.3. Confusingly, NHTSA employs a diﬀerent
classiﬁcation system for the purpose of fuel economy standards. See 49 C.F.R. § 523.2 (“Light truck
means a non-passenger automobile as deﬁned in § 523.5.”).
3 2003 SUV Safety Hearing, supra note 1, at 2 (statement of Sen. Barbara Boxer, Member, S.
Comm. on Com., Sci. & Transp.).
4 See
Rollover: The Hidden History of the SUV, PBS: F RONTLINE ,
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/rollover [https://perma.cc/C2QZ-2MFC] (reporting
on the then-unknown rollover risks of SUVs).
5 Cindy Skrzycki, Regulator Assails Safety of SUVs, WASH. POST (Jan. 16, 2003)
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/2003/01/16/regulator-assails-safety-ofsuvs/22a87b47-40f9-4d30-9d10-fefc3c998eeb [https://perma.cc/FHE4-J6AT].
6 2003 SUV Safety Hearing, supra note 1, at 5–8 (statement of Jeﬀrey W. Runge, Administrator
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration); id. at 29-37 (statement of Joan B. Claybrook,
President, Public Citizen).
7 Id. at 33-34 (explaining that SUVs are susceptible to rolling over during emergency maneuvers
due to their high center of gravity).
8 Id. at 7 (statement of Jeffrey W. Runge, Administrator National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration).
9 Id. at 69 (statement of Robert C. Lange, Executive Director, Vehicle Structure & Safety
Integration, General Motors Corporation).
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committee, there was a very real risk that the safety gains for light-truck
occupants was coming “at the expense of increased risks for occupants
travelling in other vehicles.”10
Based on the information presented at the hearing, one might reasonably
conclude that crash compatibility was the more pressing of the two issues, at
least from the standpoint of regulatory intervention. After all, the safetyconscious consumer might be expected to shop around to ﬁnd a light truck
equipped with anti-rollover electronic stability control (ESC) technology.11
But what incentive does the consumer have to pass on an ESC-equipped light
truck in favor of a sedan that oﬀers less occupant protection for the consumer
and their loved ones? The increased risk of injury or death to a random
stranger seems like a worthwhile tradeoﬀ for greater protection for one’s
family—a classic case of market failure.12 In that scenario, quick action to
protect those not represented in consumer decisionmaking seems warranted.
But in fact, almost the exact opposite happened.
Within two years of the hearings, Congress passed the omnibus Safe,
Accountable, Flexible, Eﬃcient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for
Users (SAFETEA-LU) Transportation Bill,13 which included a directive to
NHTSA to institute rulemaking on rollover prevention standards.14 In just a
year and a half, NHTSA issued its final rule on Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standard (FMVSS) 126, requiring ESC to be installed on all automobiles by 2011.15
Crash compatibility received a very diﬀerent treatment. Rather than
engaging in any rulemaking, NHTSA permitted the major automakers to
adopt voluntary standards to improve outcomes in light-truck-on-car
collisions, despite objections from advocacy groups.16 According to research
conducted by both NHTSA and the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety

Id. at 62 (statement of Brian O’Neill, President, Insurance Institute for Highway Safety).
Id. at 11 (statement of Jeﬀrey W. Runge, Administrator National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration) (noting the increased availability of ESC on the market).
12 Particularly so when seventy-three percent of American motorists consider themselves
above-average drivers; even if the consumer considers the chance of a fatal accident, he or she may
assume it will be the other driver’s fault. See AM. AUTOMOBILE ASS’N INC., AUTOMOTIVE
ENGINEERING FACT SHEET: VEHICLE TECHNOLOGY SURVEY—PHASE III (2018).
13 Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Eﬃcient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users
(SAFETEA-LU), Pub. L. No. 109-59, 119 Stat. 1144 (2005) (codiﬁed at 49 U.S.C. § 30126).
14 Id. § 10301, 119 Stat. at 1939 (instructing the Secretary to begin eﬀorts to establish standards
aimed to reduce rollover crashes).
15 Electronic Stability Control Systems, Controls and Displays, 72 Fed. Reg. 17,236 (Apr. 6,
2007) (codiﬁed at 49 C.F.R. § 571.126).
16 Letter from Laura MacCleery, Counsel for Auto Safety & Regul. Affs., Pub. Citizen, to Dr. Jeffrey
Runge, Adm’r, Natl’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin. (Aug. 22, 2003) (available at https://www.citizen.org/wpcontent/uploads/compatibility_report_comments.pdf) [https://perma.cc/5KEZ-WQYX] (arguing that crash
compatibility standards should be mandatory).
10
11
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(IIHS), these voluntary standards have been, at best, only moderately effective
for light-truck-on-car fatality rates and insignificant for pickup-on-car fatalities.17
The stark contrast between the regulatory response to rollovers and crash
compatibility is in many ways a microcosm of our auto-safety regime. But for
all its illustrative value, this story only partially captures the magnitude of
our current failures. There is another mounting catastrophe that eclipses the
crash-compatibility issue in both its human toll and the scandal of NHTSA’s
inaction: the pedestrian fatality crisis.
Over the past decade, pedestrian fatalities in the U.S. have increased more
than fifty percent, surpassing 6,500 deaths in 2019 (despite a decrease in the
overall traffic death rate)—a thirty-year high.18 If taken as a separate category,
automobile-on-pedestrian strikes would rank as the eighth-most-common
cause of injury death in the country.19 This death toll has hardly slowed, even
in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic. Despite a national double-digit
percentage decrease in miles driven, pedestrian fatalities actually increased in
the first half of 2020, resulting in the greatest single-year increase in the
pedestrian fatality rate ever recorded.20 And while NHTSA was at least able
to secure a voluntary agreement from automakers to address compatibility, the
regulatory response to this decade-long crisis has been virtually nonexistent—
drawing criticism from two separate federal oversight agencies.21
17 NATHAN K. GREENWELL, U. S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., DOT HS 811 621, EVALUATION OF THE
ENHANCING VEHICLE-TO-VEHICLE CRASH COMPATIBILITY AGREEMENT: EFFECTIVENESS OF
THE PRIMARY AND SECONDARY ENERGY-ABSORBING STRUCTURES ON PICKUP TRUCKS AND
SUVS, at iv (2012) (ﬁnding an average reduction of 8% for light trucks as a whole through 2010, but
a 5% increase for pickups and no reduction for more than half of vehicles studied); Samuel S. Monfort
& Joseph M. Nolan, Ins. Inst. for Highway Safety, Trends in Aggressivity and Driver Risk for Cars,
SUVs, and Pickups: Vehicle Incompatibility From 1989 to 2016, 20 TRAFFIC INJ. PREVENTION 592, 592
(2019) (ﬁnding SUVs were still 28% more likely to cause a fatality in a collision with a car as of 2016,
and that pickup trucks were just as incompatible as they were before the standards were adopted).
By 2010, every LTV for sale in the United States had been self-certiﬁed as compliant with the
voluntary standards. GREENWELL, supra, at 1.
18 See GOVERNORS HIGHWAY SAFETY ASS’N, PEDESTRIAN TRAFFIC FATALITIES BY
STATE: 2019 PRELIMINARY DATA 5 tbl.1, 12 (2020) (showing an increase in fatalities since 2009 and
noting that 2019 was the deadliest year since 1988).
19 See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, 10 LEADING CAUSES OF INJURY DEATHS BY AGE
GROUP (2018) (showing 6,237 suicide poisoning deaths as the eighth leading cause of death).
20 Press Release, Governor’s Highway Safety Ass’n, Projected 2020 U.S. Pedestrian Death Rate
on Pace for Record High Despite Significant Drop in Driving (Mar. 23, 2021),
https://www.ghsa.org/resources/news-releases/pedestrians21 [https://perma.cc/MKY8-FSXA] (noting
a 20% increase over 2019 in the pedestrian fatality rate per vehicle mile travelled).
21 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-20-419, PEDESTRIAN SAFETY: NHTSA
NEEDS TO DECIDE WHETHER TO INCLUDE PEDESTRIAN SAFETY TESTS IN ITS NEW CAR
ASSESSMENT PROGRAM (2020) [hereinafter GAO PEDESTRIAN REPORT] (noting that, as a result
NHTSA’s inaction in including pedestrian safety data in NCAP updates, “the public lacks clarity on
NHTSA’s eﬀorts to address [pedestrian] safety risks”); NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., NTSB/SIR18/03, PEDESTRIAN SAFETY: SPECIAL INVESTIGATION REPORT 22 [hereinafter NTSB
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These twin issues—pedestrian safety and crash incompatibility—share
similar pathologies. Both have signiﬁcant and alarming equity implications,
disproportionately burdening women, low-income communities, and people
of color. And, crucially, both are exacerbated by vehicle design choices that
are closely tied to the American appetite for SUVs and pickups.22 While a
global “Vision Zero” movement to eliminate traﬃc fatalities has put forward
a compelling roadmap to address traﬃc violence from a transportationplanning systems approach,23 relatively little attention has been paid to the
design of the vehicles moving within those systems. As light trucks capture a
growing portion of the market, including nearly three out of every four sales
in 2020,24 unaddressed vehicle design issues will continue to stymie eﬀorts to
reduce the avoidable human toll imposed by our transportation system.
To explain these two failures, this Comment presents original research
from a half-century of federal auto-safety policy, from the origins of NHTSA
and the National Traﬃc and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (MVSA)25 to the
present. Drawing on that history, I connect NHTSA’s ongoing failures to an
unduly narrow, consumer-centered regulatory approach that struggles to
address equity concerns or externalized dangers. Addressing this crisis, I
argue, requires us to reframe auto safety not as a consumer protection issue
but as a matter of “transportation justice”—to explicitly consider equity and
the distributional consequences of vehicle designs in safety policymaking.26
This Comment begins with an evaluation of the current state of auto
safety. Part I makes the case that growing light truck sales represent not only
a safety crisis, but a serious threat to equity in transportation. This crisis is a
product of the unaddressed, externalized safety risks that light trucks create
for other road users. Part II examines the statutory toolkit at NHTSA’s
PEDESTRIAN REPORT] (noting that NHTSA “has not yet acted” to incorporate a decade-old
international pedestrian safety standard into the FMVSS).
22 See infra Part I.
23 V ISION Z ERO N ETWORK, C ORE E LEMENTS FOR V ISION Z ERO C OMMUNITIES
2(2018) (outlining ten elements of the Vision Zero strategy). The Vision Zero movement
originated in Sweden and has since gained significant traction in U.S. cities and even the U.S.
Department of Transportation. See, e.g., CITY OF PHILA., VISION ZERO: THREE-YEAR
ACTION PLAN 4 (2017) (announcing a goal of zero road fatalities in Philadelphia by 2030); FED.
HIGHWAY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., FHWA-SA-18-024, TRANSPORTATION SAFETY
PLANNING AND THE ZERO DEATHS VISION: A GUIDE FOR METROPOLITAN PLANNING
ORGANIZATIONS AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES (2018) (presenting model policies to aid city
leaders in achieving zero road fatalities).
24 See Tom Voelk, Rise of S.U.V.s: Leaving Cars in Their Dust, With No Signs of Slowing,
N.Y. T IMES (May 21, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/21/business/suv-sales-bestsellers.html [https://perma.cc/5QLX-VEEB] (quoting an automotive analyst’s prediction
that light-truck sales would rise from 72% of sales in 2020 to 78% by 2025).
25 National Traﬃc and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718
(codiﬁed as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 301).
26 See infra Section IV.A.
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disposal and explains why the FMVSS must be the cornerstone of any eﬀort
to address these externalized dangers.
Part III explores ﬁve decades of NHTSA research and rulemaking on
pedestrian safety and crash incompatibility. I show that these threats were
diagnosed as early as the mid-1970s by NHTSA researchers, but rulemaking
initiatives were repeatedly postponed, deprioritized, and ultimately
abandoned. These failures, I argue, are the product of a consumerprotectionist vision that came to dominate auto-safety policy across the
federal government, from NHTSA to the halls of Congress. This approach
regulates automobile design chieﬂy for the safety and beneﬁt of the people
who buy them while leaving other road users unprotected against the
externalized dangers of those designs.
Three decades into the light-truck boom, it is evident that addressing
those dangers and the dramatic equity issues that they create will require a
fundamental reconceptualization of auto safety. Part IV concludes that this
transformation will require NHTSA to adopt a new vision that places
transportation justice principles above consumer protection. NHTSA,
however, is not likely to achieve this on its own, and Congressional
intervention may be necessary to secure the full promise of auto safety.
I. A LIGHT-TRUCK CRISIS: SAFETY AND EQUITY
Automobiles are deadly—traﬃc violence was the second leading cause of
unintentional death by injury in the United States.27 This violence is not
inﬂicted at random, however. Not only do light trucks exact an outsized toll
on other road users, but those on the receiving end of this threat are
disproportionately low-income, people of color, and women. The dramatic
growth of the light-truck segment has had serious consequences for roadway
safety and has contributed to an equity gap at the heart of our transportation
system. Absent intervention, this crisis is likely to continue unabated.
A. The Light-Truck Crisis in Numbers
Although the outsized safety risk posed by light trucks has been widely
acknowledged for decades,28 the speciﬁc connections between light trucks,
crash incompatibility, and pedestrian safety are worth examining in detail.
27 As of 2015. See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP.,
DOT HS 812 499, MOTOR VEHICLE TRAFFIC CRASHES AS A LEADING CAUSE OF DEATH IN
THE UNITED STATES, 2015 at 4-5 (2018).
28 See Michelle White, The “Arms Race” on American Roads: The Eﬀect of SUVs and Pickup Trucks
on Traﬃc Safety, 47 J. L. & ECON. 333 (2004) (describing the dangers SUVs pose to pedestrians and
occupants of smaller cars); Kevin Case, Note, Tanks in the Streets: SUVs, Design Defects, and
Ultrahazardous Strict Liability, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 149-50 (noting the same and emphasizing the
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“Crash incompatibility” refers to the unequal distribution of injury risk
that results when a heavier, taller (or more “aggressive”) vehicle collides with
a smaller one. The greater mass of a light truck transfers more crash energy
to the struck car, while its high ride height results in misaligned crumple
zones and greater force on the passenger compartment of the smaller car.29
Despite the adoption of voluntary compatibility standards, as of 2016 SUVs
and pickups remain 28% and 158% more likely (respectively) to kill passengercar occupants in a collision.30 In fact, because the increased risk to those in
passenger cars is far greater than the safety beneﬁts light trucks provide to
their occupants, light-truck-on-car collisions are deadlier as a whole compared
to car-on-car collisions.31
The pedestrian-safety crisis is likewise a product of the light-truck boom.
Not only has the frequency of pedestrian strikes increased since 2009 (despite
overall traﬃc fatalities remaining steady and no increase in walking) but
crashes themselves have become deadlier32—a direct consequence of the
proliferation of light trucks.33 Their higher mass and tall, blunt front ends
danger posed to children). Although this Comment focuses on road safety, the externalized harms
of the light-truck boom are legion. See Laura Cozzi & Apostolos Petropoulos, Growing Preference for
SUVs Challenges Emissions Reductions in Passenger Car Market, INT’L ENERGY AGENCY (Oct. 15, 2019),
https://www.iea.org/commentaries/growing-preference-for-suvs-challenges-emissions-reductionsin-passenger-car-market [https://perma.cc/5FXH-DP45] (noting that the SUV boom negated any
climate emissions gains in the transportation sector and identifying SUVs as the second largest
contributor to CO2 increases since 2010).
29 See Monfort & Nolan, supra note 17, at 592-93 (noting that incompatibility is a result of
“conservation of momentum” and the compounding effect of “vertical misalignment between energyabsorbing structures”); Michael Anderson & Maximilian Auffhammer, Pounds that Kill: The External
Costs of Vehicle Weight 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 17170, 2011) (“[A] 1,000 pound
increase in striking vehicle weight raises the probability of a fatality in the struck vehicle by 47%.”).
30 See Monfort & Nolan, supra note 17, at 592. But see Mack Hogan, SUVs Are 28 Percent More
Likely to Kill Other Drivers in a Crash, JALOPNIK (Oct. 12, 2019, 11:40 AM), https://jalopnik.com/suvsare-28-percent-more-likely-to-kill-other-drivers-i-1838994674 (suggesting that the improvement in
SUV compatibility may be less signiﬁcant than it looks).
31 Eric M. Ossiander, Thomas D Koepsell & Barbara McKnight, Crash Fatality and Vehicle
Incompatibility in Collisions Between Cars and Light Trucks or Vans 20 INJ. PREVENTION 373, 378 (2014)
(“Although [light trucks] protect their own occupants better than cars do, [light trucks] are associated
with an excess total risk of death in crashes with cars or other [light trucks].”).
32 Wen Hu & Jessica B. Cicchino, An Examination of the Increases in Pedestrian Motor-Vehicle
Crash Fatalities During 2009–2016, 67 J. SAFETY RSCH. 37, 38-39 (2018) (ﬁnding an increase in the
number of pedestrian crashes and a 29% increase in the crash fatality rate); NAT’L COMPLETE STS.
COAL., DANGEROUS BY DESIGN 2021, at 9 (2021) (noting a 45% increase in the number of people
struck and killed by cars between 2010 and 2017 compared to a 3.7% increase in traﬃc deaths among
motor vehicle occupants during the same period, and no change in walking rates since 2009).
33 See Eric D. Lawrence, Nathan Bomey & Kristi Tanner, Death on Foot: America’s Love of SUVs Is
Killing Pedestrians, DETROIT FREE PRESS, https://www.freep.com/story/money/cars/2018/06/28/suvskilling-americas-pedestrians/646139002 (Dec. 16, 2019, 12:24 AM) [https://perma.cc/S6HJ-FW4B]
(“[Our] investigation found that the SUV revolution is a key, leading cause of escalating pedestrian
deaths nationwide . . . .”). Other common factors, such as jaywalking at night or alcohol use, do not
account for the growth. Id. According to one recent study, over 8,000 pedestrian fatalities could have
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direct greater impact forces to heads and chests; as a result, NHTSA
researchers estimate that pedestrians are up to three times more likely to be
killed when struck by a light truck than a passenger car.34 This heightened
risk has led to an incredible 81% increase in pedestrian fatalities involving
SUVs between 2009 and 2016.35 With declining occupant fatalities, the
portion of traﬃc victims outside vehicles (including both pedestrians and
bicyclists) has risen from 20% in 1996 to 34% in 2019—the highest percentage
since NHTSA began collecting fatality data.36
B. The Light-Truck Crisis as an Equity Issue
As alarming as the light-truck crisis is in absolute terms, another facet
provides even greater reason for alarm. A mountain of research suggests that
the risks posed by our light-truck-dominated passenger vehicle ﬂeet are
distributed in ways that reinforce inequalities. Women, low-income
communities, and people of color disproportionately suﬀer the consequences
of crash incompatibility and pedestrian strikes.
Not only are light-truck owners wealthier and more likely to be white, but
lower-income people tend to drive older automobiles with lower crash-test
ratings37—making them particularly vulnerable to crash incompatibility
dangers. And when they do buy new vehicles, both low-income people and
people of color have less access to light trucks: racial and ethnic minorities
are signiﬁcantly underrepresented in light-truck ownership,38 and the ten
been averted since 2000 if all light trucks were replaced by cars. Justin Tyndall, Pedestrian Deaths and
Large Vehicles, 26 ECON. OF TRANSP. 1, 9 ﬁg.6 (2021).
34 See Tyndall, supra note 33, at 1-2 (estimating that pedestrians struck by light trucks are two
to three times more likely to die than pedestrians struck by cars); Lawrence et al., supra note 33
(quoting a biomechanical engineer on the physics of pedestrian strikes); New Car Assessment
Program, 80 Fed. Reg. 78,522, 78,547 (Dec. 16, 2015).
35 See Hu & Cicchino, supra note 32, at 41 tbl.6 (showing data, including raw numbers and percentage
change, of fatal single-vehicle pedestrian crashes by vehicle type).
36 See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., DOT HS 813
060, OVERVIEW OF MOTOR VEHICLE CRASHES IN 2019 at 4 ﬁg.4 (2020) (showing the proportion
of vehicle occupant to non-occupant fatalities from 1975 to 2019).
37 See Zeenat Kotval & Igor Vojnovic, A Socio-ecological Exploration into Urban Form: The
Environmental Costs of Travel, 128 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 87, 94 (2016) (noting that more than half of
higher-income residents’ car ﬂeets are SUVs, minivans, and trucks, compared to less than a quarter
of low-income residents’ ﬂeets); Kea Wilson, SUV and Pickup Purchases Soar–But Who’s Buying?
STREETSBLOG (Apr. 21, 2021), https://usa.streetsblog.org/2021/04/21/suv-and-pickup-purchasessoar-but-whos-buying [https://perma.cc/F23D-Y3Z6] (citing research that light-truck buyers are
“disproportionately white” and “relatively wealthy”); Kristina B. Metzger, Emma Sartin, Robert D.
Foss, Nina Joyce & Allison E. Curry, Vehicle Safety Characteristics in Vulnerable Driver Populations, 21
TRAFFIC INJ. PREVENTION 54, 54 (2020) (“[A]cross all age groups[,] drivers of higher
[socioeconomic status] were in newer and safer vehicles compared with those of lower
[socioeconomic status].”).
38 Wilson, supra note 37.
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cheapest new vehicles for sale in the U.S. are all sedans or hatchbacks.39 The
diﬀerential consequences of crash incompatibility also play out along gender
lines. Women occupants are 28% more likely to die (and up to 73% more likely
to be injured) in a crash than men, a disparity that is directly related to the
higher rates of light-truck ownership among men.40
Pernicious inequities are even more startling in the context of the
pedestrian crisis. The crisis is deﬁned by signiﬁcant spatial inequalities—
neighborhoods with the highest rates of pedestrian strikes often have the
lowest rates of automobile ownership41—and those inequalities
disproportionately burden poor and minority neighborhoods.42 Local
disparities also play out at the national level: Black, American Indian, Paciﬁc
Islander, and Hispanic people are signiﬁcantly overrepresented in pedestrian
fatalities, with Black and Native people each killed at a rate nearly double
their population share.43
Finally, it is important to highlight that the human toll of the light-truck
crisis is not exacted in a vacuum, but in the context of transportation systems
and public space. The burden of this crisis is not only in the death and injury
it visits on victims, but also in the limitations it places on the right to mobility
and to simply exist on public streets. Pedestrians (and to a lesser extent cardrivers) must regulate their mobility in ways that are not required of light-

39 Austin Irwin, 10 Cheapest New Cars for 2021, CAR & DRIVER (Dec. 23, 2020),
https://www.caranddriver.com/features/g34908888/10-cheapest-new-cars-for-2021
[https://perma.cc/DD8S-RT6Q]. This is true even as automakers drop passenger cars from their
model lineups in favor of SUVs. See Patrick Olsen, GM Becomes Latest Car Company to Drop Some
Sedans, CONSUMER REPS. (Nov. 26, 2018), https://www.consumerreports.org/general-motors/gmto-drop-some-sedans [https://perma.cc/ZD7P-FKSA] (explaining that GM is the third car company
to drop sedans from its lineup in favor of more proﬁtable SUVs and pickup trucks).
40 Vehicle Choice, Crash Differences Help Explain Greater Injury Risks for Women, INS. INST. FOR HIGHWAY
SAFETY (Feb. 11, 2021), https://www.iihs.org/news/detail/vehicle-choice-crash-differences-help-explaingreater-injury-risks-for-women [https://perma.cc/7L3L-RKJM] (describing the results of a recent study
attributing differential injury rates between men and women to lower incidence of LTV ownership).
41 Charlotte Lee Jackson, Who Drives Cars, Who Gets Hit by Cars, and Why, GREATER
GREATER WASH. (Feb. 17, 2021), https://ggwash.org/view/80438/who-drives-cars-who-gets-hit-bycars-and-why [https://perma.cc/DQS8-65MD] (ﬁnding pedestrian death disparities in Washington,
D.C. even after accounting for increased walking rates).
42 Mike Maciag, Mean Streets, GOVERNING, Aug. 2014, at 34, 36 (ﬁnding that the bottom third
of census tracts by per-capita income have double the pedestrian fatality rate of higher per-capita
income groups and noting disproportionate impacts on minority communities).
43 See GOVERNORS HIGHWAY SAFETY ASS’N, PEDESTRIAN TRAFFIC FATALITIES BY
STATE: 2020 PRELIMINARY DATA 15-16 (2021) (presenting the percent of total pedestrian fatalities
between 2015 and 2019 by race). This disparity holds, at least for Black and Hispanic men, even
when controlling for socioeconomic status and traffic exposure. Tara Goddard, Kimberly
Barsamian Kahn & Arlie Adkins, Racial Bias in Driver Yielding Behavior at Crosswalks 33 Transp.
Rsch. Part F 1, 2 (2015). A possible contributing factor is that drivers are less likely to yield to
Black pedestrians. Id. at 4.
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truck drivers to avoid death or injury,44 while the presence of destructive
vehicles sends a message that some road users have a greater right to exist
safely in those spaces than others.45 And as these harms fall
disproportionately on already-vulnerable groups, they further reinforce
inequalities in society.
C. A Permanent Crisis
There is little reason to assume that the light-truck boom and its attendant
dangers and inequities will disappear on their own.46 Not only is the shift to
light trucks being promoted by automakers themselves,47 the shift is also selfreinforcing, as car drivers increasingly feel unsafe on roads dominated by light
trucks.48 Nor are technological and design changes within the light-truck
segment likely to resolve the issue completely. Emerging crash-avoidance and
autonomous technologies are only marginally eﬀective,49 and the fact remains
that pedestrian safety and crash incompatibility issues are largely products of
vehicle height and weight—inherent features of the light-truck segment
which may not be ﬁxable with simple redesigns.
44 For instance, pedestrians are expected to “look both ways” before crossing the street,
even in a marked crosswalk where they have the right-of-way over oncoming traffic.
See, e.g., Pedestrian Safety, PA. DEP’T OF TRANSP., https://www.penndot.gov/TravelInPA/Safety/
TrafficSafetyAndDriverTopics/Pages/Pedestrian-Safety.aspx [https://perma.cc/9VUJ-Z7SS]. Drivers of
SUVs, on the other hand, are more likely to engage in more reckless behavior. See Peter Wallner,
Anna Wanka & Hans-Peter Hutter, SUV Driving “Masculinizes” Risk Behavior in Females: A Public
Health Challenge, 129 WIENER KLINISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 625, 625, 628 (2017) (noting
riskier traffic behavior associated with SUV drivers and finding that women who drive SUVs
break certain traffic rules at rates typically associated with male drivers).
45 See Gregg Culver, Death and the Car: On (Auto)Mobility, Violence, and Injustice, 17 ACME 144,
162 (2018) (“Vehicular violence produces landscapes of fear and anxiety, and hence social and physical
exclusion, marginalization, and immobilization. . . . [I]t also has a constitutive role in shaping
unequal urban geographies.”).
46 Voelk, supra note 24 (“[E]xperts expect [SUV sales] will only grow.”).
47 See Keith Naughton, Jamie Butters, David Welch & Tommaso Ebhardt, The American Sedan is Dying.
Long Live the SUV, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 16, 2018, 5:01 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/201801-16/why-the-american-sedan-is-marked-for-death [https://perma.cc/8T9E-J5CL] (“[A]utomakers are
racing to ditch slow-selling cars in favor of the big rigs that mint them money.”).
48 Henry Grabar, The SUV Arms Race, SLATE (Nov. 30, 2018, 12:11 PM),
https://slate.com/technology/2018/11/suv-arms-race-pick-up-car-safety-headlights-visibility-crash.html
[https://perma.cc/LW2W-XFXP] (“One reason to buy a bigger vehicle? Everyone else is.”).
49 Five times as many pedestrian fatalities occur at night as in the daytime, but current crashavoidance technologies are minimally eﬀective at night. GAO PEDESTRIAN REPORT, supra note 21,
at 51 Fig. 11 (showing pedestrian fatalities by light conditions); AM. AUTOMOBILE ASS’N INC.,
AUTOMATIC EMERGENCY BRAKING WITH PEDESTRIAN DETECTION 47 (2019) (concluding from
ﬁeld tests of crash avoidance systems that such systems were “ineﬀective during nighttime
conditions”). In addition, advanced crash-avoidance technologies add considerably to the sticker
price of vehicles, placing new, safer automobiles further out of reach of low-income buyers. See
ETHAN DOUGLAS, CONSUMER REPS., A HIGH PRICE ON SAFETY 1 (2020) (concluding that crashavoidance technologies increase the cost of vehicles by thousands of dollars).
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II. THE AUTO SAFETY FRAMEWORK
That the externalized harms and inequities created by light trucks have
gone unchecked is all the more surprising given the extensive federal
involvement in auto-safety regulation. Indeed, auto safety is the raison d’être
of an entire operating agency of the U.S. Department of Transportation: the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. Since its formation in
1970, NHTSA has been charged with administering the auto-safety
provisions of the 1966 Motor Vehicle Safety Act (MVSA), the
groundbreaking statute that for the first time subjected auto design to
comprehensive federal regulation in the name of road safety.50 Crucially, the
MVSA unequivocally tasks NHTSA with the safety of the public, both
occupants and non-occupants alike.51
Since NHTSA’s inception, Congress has expanded not only its
administrative toolkit for inﬂuencing vehicle safety, but the agency’s
responsibility for a number of auto-design issues unrelated to safety.52 Today,
NHTSA can choose to address vehicle design by setting safety standards, by
ordering recalls of defective vehicles, and by distributing information to
consumers on vehicle crashworthiness. But only one of these tools—
mandatory vehicle performance requirements set in the Federal Motor
Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS)—is adequate to the task of addressing
the externalized dangers and equity issues created by light trucks.
Safety Standards. At the heart of the MVSA is the idea that the federal
government should directly regulate vehicle design through the FMVSS.53
Under the rulemaking authority created by the Act, NHTSA can propose
minimum safety performance and equipment requirements for automobiles,
Highway Safety Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-605, 84 Stat. 1739, 1739-40.
49 U.S.C. § 30102(a)(9) (defining “motor vehicle safety” as vehicle performance that “protects
the public against unreasonable risk”) (emphasis added). See also infra note 87 and accompanying text
(noting that one of the first safety standards ever issued involved non-occupant safety).
52 These include theft-prevention and odometer-fraud regulations, 49 C.F.R. §§ 541, 580;
bumper performance requirements to minimize repair costs, 49 C.F.R. § 581.5; and the Corporate
Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards, administered jointly with the Environmental Protection
Agency. 49 C.F.R. § 541. See 49 U.S.C. § 32902. Enacted in response to the OPEC crisis, CAFE
was originally designed to simply reduce fuel consumption and provide consumers with fueleﬃcient vehicle choices; it has since become an imperfect proxy for controlling automotive
greenhouse gas emissions. See Energy Policy and Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 94-163, 89 Stat.
871, 874 (1975) (“The purposes of this Act are . . . to provide for improved energy eﬃciency of motor
vehicles.”). Many commenters have posited that loopholes within CAFE for larger vehicles have
encouraged the proliferation of light trucks. See, e.g., Ryan Beene, Is CAFE Making Cars Bigger? AUTO.
NEWS (Aug. 14, 2016, 1:00 AM), https://www.autonews.com/article/20160814/OEM11/308159946/is-cafemaking-cars-bigger [https://perma.cc/ALM4-D6L5].
53 See JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 47
(1990) [hereinafter THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY] (describing the centrality of rulemaking
to the MVSA).
50
51
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provided that those requirements are “practicable, meet the need for motor
vehicle safety, and [are] stated in objective terms.”54 As long as the agency
considered whether the proposed standard was “reasonable, practicable, and
appropriate” for the specific type of vehicle, the standard may reach every
new automobile sold in the U.S.55 By prescribing minimum performance
requirements that all new vehicles must meet, the FMVSS provide the most
straightforward means of addressing both pedestrian impact protection and
crash compatibility.56
Recalls. Dating to the original MVSA, NHTSA’s recall authority allows
the agency to address safety defects in automobiles on a case-by-case basis.57
When a manufacturer learns of a safety defect (either on notice from NHTSA
or uncovered on its own initiative), it must notify all owners and, if the owner
chooses, repair the defect free of charge.58 This provision essentially
authorizes NHTSA to enforce implied warranties; crucially, it applies only to
defects, which (as in product liability law) require the failure of some
component measured relative to the likelihood of failure in other vehicles.59
NHTSA’s recall authority is not a viable avenue to addressing the dangers
of light trucks. First, any road-safety beneﬁts of the recall program are
entirely dependent on individual owners electing to have the defect
addressed.60 Because NHTSA has no ability to compel owners to respond to
recalls, more than 20% of recalled vehicles never remedied; worse, light-truck
owners are the least likely to respond to recall notices.61 And given that lighttruck owners are not the primary victims of crash incompatibility and
49 U.S.C. § 30111(a).
Id. § 30111(b)(3).
For example, a pedestrian protection standard might require that, for any automobile sold
in the U.S., a pedestrian dummy struck at x speed will experience no more than y force to the head.
Cf. 49 C.F.R. § 571.201 (setting performance requirements for interior protection using test
dummies under FMVSS 201).
57 49 U.S.C. §§ 30118-20.
58 49 U.S.C. §§ 30118(b)(2), (c), 30120(a).
59 United States v. Gen. Motors. Corp., 841 F.2d 400, 404 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (“[A] vehicle
contains a defect if it is subject to a signiﬁcant number of failures in normal operation.” (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 415 (upholding dismissal of NHTSA enforcement
action based on ﬁnding that the subject vehicle “was no more likely than other vehicles to be
involved” in failures); see also THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY, supra note 53, at 167
(summarizing a number of circuit court opinions to deﬁne “defect” as “a failure of some part of a
vehicle to perform up to the usual standards expected” (emphasis added)); id. at 129 (noting that
NHTSA did not consider vehicles defective if they conformed to industrywide standards).
60 Whether the recall program has any road safety beneﬁts at all is unknown; NHTSA has
never conducted a cost–beneﬁt analysis on rulemaking, and vehicle component failures are
responsible for less than one percent of accidents. Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, From
Command and Control to Collaboration and Deference: The Transformation of Auto Safety Regulation, 34
YALE J. ON REGUL. 167, 251-52 (2017) [hereinafter Command and Control].
61 See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., REPORT TO
CONGRESS: “VEHICLE SAFETY RECALL COMPLETION RATES REPORT” 26, 28 (2017).
54
55
56
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pedestrian strikes, it seems unlikely that owners would prioritize recalls
addressing those issues. On a more fundamental level, the dangers that light
trucks pose to other road users are by and large due to features inherent to
the class—vehicles’ height and weight.62 This increased danger exists whether
or not any component or system has malfunctioned and exists in all light
trucks regardless of manufacturer. Just as courts have been unwilling to ﬁnd
light trucks categorically “defective” in the products liability context,63
NHTSA’s recall authority will not reach these dangers.
Consumer Education. Since 1978, NHTSA has provided consumers with
information on the safety of speciﬁc models through the New Car Assessment
Program (NCAP).64 Under this program, NHTSA subjects new automobiles
to four diﬀerent crash tests, and assigns a 1 to 5 Star rating to the model based
on its performance.65 This is simply a consumer-education service, though,
and carries no legal force: A vehicle that scores zero out of ﬁve possible stars
may still be sold in the U.S. so long as it complies with the FMVSS. The
NCAP’s inﬂuence on road safety therefore depends entirely on the weight that
consumers and manufacturers give to the ratings. Despite these limitations,
the NCAP program has recently been proposed as a potential ﬁx to the
pedestrian safety crisis, with both government and private advocates urging
NHTSA to include a pedestrian safety test in the NCAP.66
However, there is good reason to doubt that the NCAP program can
meaningfully address the light-truck crisis. First, it assumes a certain level
of safety-consciousness among light-truck consumers—but many light-truck
owners take an oppositional approach to road-safety concerns.67 More
importantly, since vehicle height and weight negatively correlate with
increased pedestrian safety and crash compatibility but positively correlate
with increased occupant protection, neither consumer self-interest nor
rating systems themselves will fully guard against externalized risks. If
pedestrian safety is listed as a standalone category alongside the occupantprotection score, it seems naïve to imagine even the most safety-conscious
See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
Kevin Case, Note, Tanks in the Streets: SUVs, Design Defects, and Ultrahazardous Strict Liability,
81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 149, 196-97 (noting that product liability suits against SUV manufacturers have failed).
64 49 C.F.R. §§ 575.301-302.
65 See Ratings, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., https://www.nhtsa.gov/ratings
[https://perma.cc/QB9Z-SGS8] (describing the four tests NHTSA conducts).
66 See GAO PEDESTRIAN REPORT, supra note 21; Testimony of Joan Claybrook on Suggestions
for Enhancements to the New Car Assessment Program, PUB. CITIZEN (Mar. 7, 2007),
https://www.citizen.org/article/testimony-of-joan-claybrook-on-suggestions-for-enhancements-to-the-newcar-assessment-program-ncap-at-the-nhtsa-public-meeting [https://perma.cc/BNL8-JQ3R] (“I challenge
NHTSA to follow the lead of the rest of the world by taking a far more aggressive stand against the dangers
vehicles pose to pedestrians . . . .”).
67 See NAT’L SAFETY COUNCIL, SEAT BELTS: SAFETY BY THE NUMBERS (2020) (noting that
pickup truck drivers and passengers had a lower rate of seatbelt usage).
62
63
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consumer forgoing the significant occupant-protection benefits of light
trucks simply because of the potential threat they pose to strangers.68 And
even when existing safety ratings incorporate pedestrian safety into
comprehensive, single-variable scores, the offsetting occupant-protection
benefits of light trucks may cancel out any score penalty for external harms.69
Finally (and most fundamentally), the alarming inequalities of the lighttruck crisis should lead us to question whether it is morally defensible to
allow whiter, wealthier light-truck consumers to decide the level of safety
and protection that other road users receive.
Despite the limitations of both the recall program and the NCAP in
addressing design-safety issues, they have become increasingly prominent
aspects of the auto-safety framework.70 The reasons for this shift will be explored
in subsequent sections, but it is worth noting here that a recent report from the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) critiquing NHTSA’s pedestrian
safety efforts did not even discuss rulemaking as a potential solution.71
III. FIFTY YEARS OF AUTO SAFETY
Understanding the origins and extent of NHTSA’s failure to respond to
the light-truck crisis allows us both to contextualize our present situation
and, more importantly, gauge the ability of our auto safety regime to meet
the historic moment. This section traces the heretofore-untold history of
NHTSA’s engagement with pedestrian safety and crash incompatibility in
the postwar era, a history spanning more than fifty years of government
research, rulemaking initiatives, and proposed rules without a single entry
68 This is especially doubtful given that news media and safety education narratives
frequently portray pedestrian victims as responsible for pedestrian strikes—why should the
consumer sacrifice protection for themselves and their own family to avoid injuring someone
whose own misconduct puts them in harm’s way? See Richard Florida, How Media Coverage of Car
Crashes Downplays the Role of Drivers, BLOOMBERG CITYLAB (Dec. 10, 2019, 11:35 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-12-10/why-news-coverage-of-car-crashes-favorsdrivers [https://perma.cc/69AR-2SVH] (describing research showing news coverage of traffic
violence “overwhelmingly . . . shift[s] blame onto pedestrians and cyclists . . . .”).
69 For example, pedestrian avoidance technologies are currently factored into IIHS safety
ratings. However, the Acura RDX SUV received IIHS’ highest rating, “Top Safety Pick+,” despite
striking a child-sized mannequin at 20 mph. 2020 Acura RDX, INS. INST. FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY,
https://www.iihs.org/ratings/vehicle/acura/rdx-4-door-suv/2020 [https://perma.cc/5DYQ-5Z7B]. In
addition, ﬁve out of six IIHS pedestrian-avoidance tests are conducted at twenty-ﬁve mph or below,
even though collisions above thirty mph are responsible for ﬁve times as many pedestrian fatalities.
GAO PEDESTRIAN REPORT, supra note 21, at 17, ﬁg.7.
70 Command and Control, supra note 60, at 173 (“NHTSA is now predominantly a provider of
consumer safety information (NCAP), an enforcer of implied warranties (product recalls), a codifier of
industry practice, a broker of voluntary agreements, and a promoter of best practices and guidelines.”).
71 GAO PEDESTRIAN REPORT, supra note 21, at 39 (recommending that NHTSA document
an evaluation plan, document the process for making changes to NCAP, and decide whether to
include pedestrian safety tests in NCAP).
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in the current Code of Federal Regulations to show for it. Indeed, the day
the first Ford Explorer rolled off the line at Louisville Assembly in 1990 to
kick off the SUV boom, NHTSA had fifteen years’ worth of research on
pedestrian impacts and crash compatibility to predict the exact threats the
new model would pose. Federal regulators’ failure to act allowed an obvious
problem to fester into a full-blown crisis.
A. Setting Safety Standards
Before exploring in detail the twin histories of pedestrian-safety and
crash-incompatibility standards, it is worth tracing briefly the general trajectory
of rulemaking within NHTSA. After all, this Comment is far from the first to
point out that our auto safety regime has fallen short of its founding vision.72
In their seminal book The Struggle for Auto Safety, Jerry Mashaw and David
Harfst explore a theory of legal culture in the administrative state using the
history of NHTSA as a backdrop.73 Looking primarily at the two policymaking tools created by the original MVSA—recalls and the FMVSS—the
authors trace the decline of signiﬁcant rulemaking at NHTSA from its
inception to the late 1980s, accompanied by a corresponding expansion of
recall activity.74 Following a brief era of rulemaking productivity between
1966 and 1974, the authors contend that NHTSA abandoned rulemaking in
the face of judicial and congressional hostility.75 At the same time, Congress
and courts repeatedly upheld and expanded NHTSA’s recall authority.76
Mashaw and Harfst diagnose this trend as the result of an American legal
culture that strongly disfavors broad-stroke, forward-looking rules (like the
FMVSS) compared to case-by-case, retroactive adjudications (like recalls).77
Though sweeping in its coverage, neither The Struggle for Auto Safety nor the
72 See, e.g., Sarah C. Bronin, Rules of the Road: The Struggle for Safety & the Unmet Promise of
Federalism, 106 IOWA L. REV. 2153, 2184 (2021) (describing the dominance of NHTSA in auto-design
regulation as a failure of federalism); Gregory H. Shill, Should Law Subsidize Driving? 95 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 498, 564 (2020) (noting how lax safety regulations act as an indirect subsidy for automobility).
73 THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY, supra note 53.
74 Id. at 10-12.
75 See id. at 11-12 (describing the productive years); id. at 95-103 (describing the impact of
judicial review); id. at 131-140 (describing Congress’ repudiation of NHTSA’s ignition interlock
standard). But see LEE VINSEL, MOVING VIOLATIONS: AUTOMOBILES, EXPERTS, AND
REGULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 129-48 (2019) (examining the interior protection standard
and concluding that NHTSA was “from the beginning, weak and unable to push safety technologies
forward”). By the Reagan administration, rulemaking was enthusiastically abandoned in the name
of deregulation. THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY at 11; see also MARISSA MARTINO GOLDEN,
WHAT MOTIVATES BUREAUCRATS? POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION DURING THE REAGAN
YEARS 42-44, 46 (2000) (describing attempts to derail rulemaking under Reagan).
76 See THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY, supra note 53, at 110 (describing Congressional
expansion of recall authority in 1974); id. at 149-56 (describing courts’ approval of NHTSA recalls).
77 Id. at 24-25 (describing their theory of legal culture).
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authors’ 2017 follow-up article78 are comprehensive: Pedestrians are almost
completely absent from their narrative, and vehicle incompatibility receives
only passing mention.
The extent and signiﬁcance of this alleged retreat from rulemaking has
also been disputed.79 And whatever the quantitative scope of rulemaking
activity, it is incontrovertible that some signiﬁcant rules have been issued since
the 1970s. In 1984, in the middle of Mashaw and Harfst’s “ice age” of
rulemaking, NHTSA issued a monumental rule on airbags and automated
seatbelts.80 And since the 1980s, NHTSA has promulgated and revised
standards on a regular basis, often at Congressional insistence. A half-dozen
transportation omnibus bills—ISTEA, TREAD, KTSA, SAFETEA-LU, and
MAP-21—have resulted in new or revised standards on everything from the
aforementioned ESC requirement to power-window switches.81 Everything,
of course, but pedestrian impact protection or crash compatibility.
Whatever the merits of Mashaw and Harfst’s thesis, it is clear that
rulemaking has continued in some areas, while the most signiﬁcant
externalized threats posed by the light-truck boom have gone unaddressed.
According to NHTSA’s own analyses of the lifesaving impact of rulemaking,
FMVSS-mandated design and technology changes have saved the lives of
more than 600,000 car and light-truck occupants from 1960 to 2012, but fewer
than 3,000 pedestrian, cyclist and motorcyclist lives combined.82
This trend deﬁes explanation solely by reference to broad rulemaking
trends. Nor is this a plausible result of lack of knowledge of the dangers or
lack of foresight on the part of NHTSA regulators; light trucks did not

Command and Control, supra note 60.
See Justice Denied: Rules Delayed on Auto Safety and Mental Health, Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Oversight, Fed. Rights & Agency Action, 113th Cong. 24-25 (2013) (testimony of Cary Coglianese,
Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania) (arguing that Mashaw and Harfst’s claims have “little
empirical support”). But see Command and Control, supra note 60, at 182-85 (citing data showing that
the most substantial safety standards in terms of cost and weight imposed and lives saved were all
rules in eﬀect in 1974 or modiﬁcations of rules in eﬀect in 1974).
80 See THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY, supra note 53, at 209-211 (discussing the ﬁnal rule
issued on July 17, 1984 related to seat belts and airbags). This was only after the Supreme Court
struck down NHTSA’s attempt to completely withdraw the rule in Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 34 (1983).
81 See Command and Control, supra note 60, at 199-202, 214 (summarizing these statutes).
Mashaw and Harfst describe this recent spate of rulemaking as a “co-regulatory rebound,” suggesting
that many standards are simply codifying industry practice. Id. at 216-17. Notably, however, the “coregulatory rebound” failed to result in the codiﬁcation into the FMVSS of the industry’s voluntary
crash-compatibility standards.
82 CHARLES J. KAHANE, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., DOT HS 812 069, LIVES SAVED BY
VEHICLE SAFETY TECHNOLOGIES AND ASSOCIATED FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY
STANDARDS, 1960 TO 2012: PASSENGER CARS AND LTVS, at xxxii-xxxiii (2015).
78
79
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emerge without warning in the 1990s.83 And as the following sections show,
NHTSA has conducted extensive research over ﬁve decades on pedestrian
safety and incompatibility; by the mid-1970s, the agency was well aware of
the role that vehicle height and weight play in those externalized threats.
B. Pedestrian Safety
Perhaps surprisingly, pedestrian safety was a fairly visible part of the autosafety movement that culminated in the Motor Vehicle Safety Act. No less
than Ralph Nader—herald of the auto-safety movement, responsible more
than any other individual for the Act’s passage—latched on to pedestrian
safety in his multi-front assault on the automotive industry.84 Particularly
critical of automakers’ elevation of styling over safety, in Unsafe at Any Speed
Nader zeroed in on the decorative excess of Detroit, recounting grisly tales
of inattentive cyclists impaled on Cadillac tailﬁns.85
This approach, focused on ornaments and styling rather than hood
height and mass, would be the near-exclusive focus of pedestrian safety for
regulators over the next ten years.86 Among the first twenty standards
issued under the new act was FMVSS 211, which prohibited protruding
wheel nuts and hubcaps that could injure pedestrians and cyclists.87
Though no longer in force,88 it remains the only safety standard ever
directly addressed to pedestrian impact protection. On the heels of
FMVSS 211, the Federal Highway Administration moved on to the next
logical step, publishing in 1967 a proposed rule to ban all “decorative”
protrusions hazardous to pedestrians.89 When the newly-formed NHTSA
issued its first comprehensive rulemaking plan in 1971, it confidently
predicted a pedestrian-protection rule on exterior projections by the end
83 Light trucks represented 15% of the market as early as 1971, rising to 31% by 1988. U.S. GEN.
ACCT. OFF., GAO/RCED-90-56, MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY: PASSIVE RESTRAINTS NEEDED TO
MAKE LIGHT TRUCKS SAFER 2 (1989) [hereinafter 1989 GAO REPORT]. By the mid-1970s, at least
six diﬀerent automakers were oﬀering SUVs: the Toyota Land Cruiser, Ford Bronco, IH Scout,
Chevrolet Blazer (GM), Dodge Ramcharger (Chrysler) and Jeep Cherokee (AMC).
84 RALPH NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED: THE DESIGNED-IN DANGERS OF THE
AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE 221-25 (1965).
85 Id.
86 This is not to say that hood ornaments posed no danger to pedestrians, but focusing on a
single styling element rather than a holistic look at crash kinematics is not suﬃcient to address the
height and weight factors that drive pedestrian mortality.
87 Initial Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, 32 Fed. Reg. 2408, 2416 (Feb. 3, 1967)
(codiﬁed at 23 C.F.R. pt. 255). These standards were issued by the U.S. Department of Commerce;
the Department of Transportation would not be established until later that year.
88 FMVSS No. 211 was rescinded in 1996 after NHTSA concluded it had not had any safety
impact. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Wheel Nuts, Wheel Discs, and Hub Caps, 61 Fed.
Reg. 20,171, 20,172 (May 6, 1996) (codiﬁed at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571).
89 Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, 32 Fed. Reg. 20,865, 20,865-66 (proposed Dec. 28, 1967).
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of 1972.90 But that year, a pair of embarrassing losses before the Sixth and
Seventh Circuits significantly disrupted the agency’s rulemaking plans,
forcing NHTSA to drastically reassess its regulatory approach.91
The delay had a silver lining, however. In support of its rulemaking
initiative, NHTSA had commissioned several research programs on
pedestrian injury. While the research initially seemed to conﬁrm the
soundness of the ornament-focused approach,92 a subsequent study published
in 1975 highlighted for the ﬁrst time the immense importance of vehicle
height and weight in pedestrian strikes.93 Using actual crash reports, lab tests
on dummies, and computer models, the authors found among the “most
signiﬁcant injury causing parameters” were vehicle mass, vehicle height, and
the ratio of vehicle height to pedestrian height; no reference to ornaments
appears in their summary.94 For perhaps the ﬁrst time, NHTSA had a clear
picture of pedestrian impact threats.
Written in the shadow of this research, NHTSA’s next rulemaking plan
sets out a curious approach to pedestrian protection. In addition to a new
pedestrian education and enforcement eﬀort,95 this 1978 plan presented two
rulemaking paths.96 First was a “near term” rulemaking goal, with a draft rule
set to be ﬁnalized by the end of the year, targeted—unsurprisingly—at
exterior projections.97 Far more promising was the second goal, which
proposed a comprehensive pedestrian impact rule designed to “attenuate
severity of head impact,” covering both hoods and bumpers.98 But in contrast
90 See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., DOT/HS 820-163, PROGRAM PLAN FOR
MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARDS at A-12 (1971).
91 This story is detailed in THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY, supra note 53, at 95-103
(noting the decisions left the 1971 plan and its comprehensive, performance-oriented approach “in a
shambles” and drove NHTSA to focus on system-level rulemaking).
92 TRANSP. RSCH. DEP’T, CORNELL AERONAUTICAL LAB’Y, RESEARCH IN IMPACT
PROTECTION FOR PEDESTRIANS AND CYCLISTS 182 (1971) (ﬁnding that “it is obvious . . . that
non-functional sharp-pointed objects” and “pointed edges of hoods and fender corners” should be
eliminated from vehicle exterior design for safety-related purposes).
93 HAYES E. ROSS, JR. RONALD D. YOUNG, ADIL M. MAYYASI & THOMAS A. KROUSKOP,
DOT/HS 801-541, VEHICLE EXTERIORS AND PEDESTRIAN INJURY PREVENTION, VOLUME, 1, 4 (1975).
94 Id.
95 Five Year Plan for Motor Vehicle Safety and Fuel Economy Rulemaking, 43 Fed. Reg. 11,100,
11,105 (Mar. 16, 1978) [hereinafter 1978 Plan]. This approach has historically contributed to victimblaming narratives and overpolicing of pedestrians. See ANGIE SCHMITT, RIGHT OF WAY: RACE,
CLASS, AND THE SILENT EPIDEMIC OF PEDESTRIAN DEATHS IN AMERICA 49-52 (2020)
(describing how safety oﬃcials, including NHTSA, “emphasize pedestrians’ safety responsibilities
to an extreme degree while minimizing the responsibilities of drivers”); id. at 66 (noting that
criminalization of pedestrians has led to racially-biased enforcement).
96 1978 Plan, supra note 95, at 11,102. Ironically, the plan’s discussion of pedestrian safety is
inserted directly below a paragraph highlighting an “enormous increase” in light-truck use.
97 Id. at 11,102, 11,1104.
98 NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., APPENDICES TO THE NHTSA MOTOR
VEHICLE SAFETY RULEMAKING PLAN 54 (1978) [hereinafter 1978 PLAN APPENDIX].
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to the short timeline of the protrusion standard, this approach—the only one
conceivably able to address the kinematics of pedestrian strikes—had no
speciﬁc deadlines or concrete milestones. Instead, it was relegated to
“exploratory rulemaking” with a rulemaking schedule “to be determined.”99
Ultimately, neither approach saw any meaningful progress under the Carter
administration. The vague “[e]xploratory [r]ulemaking” plan, perhaps
predictably, bore no fruit.100 And despite the 1978 target date for the hood
ornament standard, by 1979 nothing had been published except a simple
meeting notice announcing a hearing on the issue.101 That meeting notice is
the only entry ever to appear on the exterior protrusion rulemaking docket;
after 1979, NHTSA eﬀectively abandoned the protrusion rule to focus its
eﬀorts on occupant protection.102
If the 1978 plan’s approach seems incongruous, obvious explanations are
elusive. Industry capture appears unlikely. The plan was issued under President
Carter’s new administrator, Joan Claybrook. Not only was Claybrook a longtime
associate of Ralph Nader and ardent safety partisan, she had worked on the
MVSA as a congressional intern and had served as an assistant to NHTSA’s first
administrator.103 Neither can the fate of the vaguely worded comprehensive
standard under the Reagan administration be handily explained by reference to
deregulatory ideology. In the face of the incoming administration’s scorchedearth approach, which saw more than a dozen pending safety standards
abandoned,104 the comprehensive standard survived.105
1981 saw the ﬁrst fruit of Claybrook’s plan, in the form of a new proposed
rule.106 It is the most recent NPRM on pedestrian impact protection that
NHTSA has issued to date. It is now forty years old. Like the 1978 plan, this
NPRM set forth a two-pronged approach to pedestrian protection. For the
near term, it proposed a “soft bumper” standard for front ends that would
99 Id. at 38, 54.
100 Id. at 38.
101 Notice of Public Meeting, 44 Fed. Reg. 51,623 (Sept. 4, 1979).
102 In a recent interview, then-Administrator Joan Claybrook describes

her decision to focus
on airbags and side impact protection instead of hood ornaments, noting that she sent an “unoﬃcial
letter” to industry leaders asking them to address it on their own. Kea Wilson, ‘The Auto Industry
Went Berserk’: Five Questions with Joan Claybrook, Former Head of NHTSA, STREETSBLOG USA (Oct.
16, 2020), https://usa.streetsblog.org/2020/10/16/the-auto-industry-went-beserk-ﬁve-questionswith-joan-claybrook-former-head-of-nhtsa [https://perma.cc/349C-S5AP].
103 THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY, supra note 53, at 58, 194.
104 OFF. OF THE PRESS SEC’Y, THE WHITE HOUSE, ACTIONS TO HELP THE U.S. AUTO
INDUSTRY, 41-57 (1981) (listing seventeen deregulatory actions planned by NHTSA).
105 U.S. REGUL. COUNCIL, THE AUTOMOBILE CALENDAR: RECENT AND PENDING
FEDERAL ACTIVITES AFFECTING MOTOR VEHICLES 309-11 (1981) (describing ongoing eﬀorts to
establish a pedestrian protection standard).
106 See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Pedestrian Impact Protection, 46 Fed. Reg.
7,015 (proposed Jan. 22, 1981) (to be codiﬁed at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571).
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address lower-body impact injuries.107 In contrast, deadly upper-body
injuries were again relegated to future rulemaking—despite NHTSA’s
acknowledgment that “vast amounts of data from numerous tests and studies”
supported a standard.108 But eﬀorts to address pedestrian safety stalled yet
again. By the end of Reagan’s second term, no progress had been made on the
proposed soft bumper rule, let alone an upper-body standard.109 In a nowfamiliar pattern, the 1988 NHTSA Status Report once again proposed a
multi-year research program to support a pedestrian-impact protection
standard, even as it acknowledged the mountain of research showing
“signiﬁcant safety improvement” from redesigned vehicle front-ends.110
Finally, in 1991—one year after the debut of the Ford Explorer111—
NHTSA oﬃcially terminated the 1981 rulemaking, ending the agency’s last
concrete attempt at a pedestrian-impact protection rule.112 Justifying the
action, NHTSA noted that the passenger-car ﬂeet had shifted dramatically
over the past decade as full-size, steel-bodied sedans of the late 1970s were
replaced with light-weight, low-proﬁle compact cars; because these cars posed
far less danger to pedestrians, NHTSA concluded that the leg injury rule
would be ineﬀective.113 Notably absent from the ﬁve-paragraph explanation
is any mention of light trucks, by then a rapidly-growing segment of the
market that embodied the same pedestrian dangers the agency had been
studying for the preceding ﬁfteen years. Although the rulemaking was
terminated, the agency promised that the long-term upper body standard was
still under consideration; “ongoing research” might one day support a rule.114
Since 1991, NHTSA has continued to drag its feet in a predictable
pattern. Despite being a lead signatory to a 1998 UN agreement on
globalized auto-safety regulations, NHTSA has made no significant progress

Id.
Id. at 46 Fed. Reg. 7019.
In contrast, NHTSA’s proposal to require a third brake light on all automobiles—the
“[C]enter [H]igh-[M]ounted [S]toplamp” rule—was issued just two weeks before the soft bumper
NPRM and had already been promulgated as a ﬁnal rule by 1983. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standards; Lamps, Reﬂective Devices, and Associated Equipment, 46 Fed. Reg. 2132 (proposed Jan.
8, 1981); Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Lamps, Reﬂective Devices, and Associated
Equipment, 48 Fed. Reg. 48,235 (Oct. 18, 1983) (codiﬁed at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571.108).
110 NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN, STATUS REPORT ON PRIORITY PROGRAMS
50, 51 (1988) [hereinafter 1988 STATUS REPORT] (describing the results of recent research and the
agency’s “consolidated, 3-5 year research program plan”). The report also reﬂects the agency’s
increasing emphasis on “pedestrian safety outreach”—an approach that has contributed to
overpolicing pedestrians and blaming them for their own deaths. Id. at 51; see also SCHMITT, supra
note 95, at 49-52 (describing the perpetuation of victim-blaming narratives).
111 Voelk, supra note 24
112 Notice of Termination of Rulemaking, 56 Fed. Reg. 14,495, 14,495-96 (Apr. 10, 1991).
113 See id. at 14,496 (comparing the 1978 Pontiac LeMans with the 1984 Mazda 626).
114 Id.
107
108
109
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on adopting the resulting international standard for pedestrian impact
protection known as Global Technical Regulation 9 (GTR-9).115 More than
a decade after GTR-9 was first written, and despite successful adoption in
the EU, Japan, and elsewhere, NHTSA has yet to issue even an advanced
rulemaking notice on incorporating the standard.116 In successive priority
plans issued between 2009 and 2015, NHTSA repeatedly indicated its intent
to begin rulemaking on GTR-9, but each new plan delayed the rulemaking
timeline further.117 And just last year, NHTSA confirmed to GAO officials
that it still had not initiated any rulemaking.118 Unsurprisingly, the agency
contended that additional data was required and touted a new pedestrian
safety research program.119
The story outlined in this section is one of endless rounds of research and
re-research, missed deadlines, and narrow, equipment-speciﬁc visions of
pedestrian protection in the face of clear evidence of the holistic nature of the
threat and its relationship to vehicle height and weight. Moreover, at no point
in their rulemaking discussions did NHTSA even acknowledge any racial or
socioeconomic disparity in pedestrian fatalities. But far from being an
isolated series of missteps, the next section shows that the story of the
pedestrian-impact standards embodies the problematic approach that federal
auto-safety regulators have taken to any externally-facing safety threat.
C. Crash Compatibility
In contrast to pedestrian safety, issues of crash compatibility did not feature
significantly in the discussions surrounding the enactment of the Motor Vehicle
Safety Act.120 Within ten years, however, NHTSA would gain a full picture of
the outsized dangers in mismatched vehicle collisions. But as with pedestrian
impacts, the next three decades passed without meaningful progress.
115 United Nations Econ. Comm’n for Europe, Global Technical Regulation No. 9: Pedestrian
Safety, ECE/TRANS/180/Add.9 (Nov. 12, 2008).
116 See World Health Organization [WHO], Global Status Report on Road Safety 2018, at 281, 398403 tbl.A12 (2018) (listing countries that have adopted GTR-9).
117 NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., NHTSA VEHICLE SAFETY RULEMAKING
AND RESEARCH PRIORITY PLAN 2009–2011, 16-17 (2009) (targeting an ANPRM by 2009); NAT’L
HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., VEHICLE SAFETY RULEMAKING AND RESEARCH
PRIORITY PLAN 2010–13, 18 (2010) (targeting an NPRM by 2011); NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC
SAFETY ADMIN., OVERVIEW OF NHTSA PRIORITY PLAN FOR VEHICLE SAFETY AND FUEL
ECONOMY, 2015 TO 2017, 12 (2015) (targeting an NPRM by 2016).
118 See GAO PEDESTRIAN REPORT, supra note 21, at 10.
119 Id. at 18-22 (identifying data limitations and discussing a pilot program for new data
collection procedures for pedestrian fatality reporting).
120 This is likely due to the relative homogeneity of the passenger car ﬂeet of the mid-1960s,
which was dominated by full-size, V8 sedans and station wagons. See JAMES J. FLINK, THE
AUTOMOBILE AGE 283-87 (1990) (describing the increasing size and engine power of domestic
automobiles and contemporary dissatisfaction with the “dinosaur in the driveway”).
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Crash compatibility first gained visibility in the wake of the energy crisis
of the early 1970s, which dramatically reshaped the landscape of the auto
market as efficient compact cars flooded roadways previously dominated by
large, V8 sedans.121 It did not take long for the implications of this newfound
fleet diversity to catch the attention of safety regulators. Testimony before
the 1974 Senate Commerce Committee oversight hearing on NHTSA laid
out in unequivocal terms both the coming danger of crash incompatibility
and the required solution.122 “If we have a system of small cars and then
introduce larger cars into this system,” testified Dr. Patrick Miller, a leading
traffic safety researcher, “the result is greater safety for the occupants of the
larger cars . . . at the expense of less safety for the occupants of the smaller
cars.”123 According to the Volkswagen R&D chief, this threat required new
regulations for crash compatibility to avoid both “unfair” safety penalties on
small cars and to make sure that larger automobiles did their “share” in
managing impact energies.124 NHTSA’s own research soon confirmed this
message; as one 1974 study concluded, the higher rates of injury in smaller
cars required that “efforts be made to reduce the aggressiveness practiced by
large cars.”125 From the 1980s to the early 2000s, a steady stream of crash
compatibility research would solidify and reinforce the risk disparity, time
and again, as the compatibility risk evolved from sedan-on-subcompact
crashes to light-truck-on-car crashes.126
NHTSA’s early rulemaking plans followed the research, at least to an
extent, and crash compatibility ﬁrst made an appearance in the 1978 Program
Plan. Describing the agency’s rulemaking priorities, the plan acknowledged
that the “enormous increase in the use of [light trucks] in lieu of conventional
passenger cars” had created new safety risks.127 But as with the comprehensive
121 See id. at 389-90 (noting high demand for smaller cars and signiﬁcant downsizing eﬀorts by
domestic automakers); Valerie A. Ramey & Daniel J. Vine, Oil, Automobiles and the U.S. Economy:
How Much Have Things Really Changed? in 25 NBER MACROECONOMICS ANN. 333, 352 ﬁg.8a
(2011) (providing data on this shift).
122 Second Session on Motor Vehicle Safety Oversight, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Com., 93d
Cong. 6-17 (1974) (statement of Dr. Patrick M. Miller, Head of Structural Dynamics Section, Calspan
Corporation); id. at 248 (statement of Ernst Fialla, Board of Managements, Volkswagenwerk).
123 Id. at 8 (statement of Patrick M. Miller, Head of Structural Dynamics Section, Calspan
Corporation).
124 Id. at 248 (statement of Ernst Fialla, Board of Managements, Volkswagenwerk).
125 Jerome M. Kossar, Big and Little Car Compatibility, in FIFTH INTERNATIONAL TECHNICAL
CONFERENCE ON EXPERIMENTAL SAFETY VEHICLES 620, 620 (Nat’l Highway Traﬃc Safety
Admin. ed. 1974).
126 See PUBLIC CITIZEN, AGGRESSIVITY AND VEHICLE COMPATIBILITY – THREE DECADES
OF RESEARCH: GROWING KNOWLEDGE REQUIRES GOVERNMENT ACTION 1 (providing a
timeline of crash incompatibility research from the 1970s to the mid-2000s).
127 1978 Plan, supra note 95, at 11,102. Within three years, the Ford F-150 pickup would become
the best-selling vehicle in the country—a title held for four straight decades. Stephen Wilmot, Cars
Are Going Digital, but Detroit Has a Long Road Ahead, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 27, 2020, 5:30 AM),
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pedestrian impact protection standard, the aggressiveness issue was slated
only for “exploratory rulemaking” with no deﬁnitive timeline.128 Rather than
the externalized risk of crash compatibility, it was the increased threat to
light-truck occupants that captured NHTSA’s attention. At the time, many of
the FMVSS applied only to passenger cars, not light trucks, and the agency
emphasized the increasing number of preventable light-truck occupant
fatalities.129 Rising to the challenge, the 1978 plan proposed extending the
existing passenger-car occupant-protection standards in the “near future” to
cover light trucks.130 And unlike the abortive plans on crash compatibility
(and pedestrian protection, for that matter), the agency stuck to the task:
Over the next decade, nine diﬀerent passenger-car standards were extended
to cover light trucks.131
Despite clear evidence of the crash-compatibility risk posed by a growing
light-truck segment,132 the issue essentially disappeared from NHTSA’s
regulatory agenda until the late 1990s. In its 1988 status report, NHTSA
devoted an entire category to “light truck safety,” highlighting its recent work
universalizing the FMVSS, but made no mention anywhere of crash
compatibility.133 Nor is it discussed in a 1990 report to Congress speciﬁcally
focused on light-truck safety;134 two years later, fatalities in light-truck-oncar collisions would surpass car-on-car collision fatalities for the ﬁrst time.135
Only in 1998 did NHTSA issue a brief report, published on the agency’s new
website, highlighting light-truck aggressiveness as a safety issue; but once

https://www.wsj.com/articles/cars-are-going-digital-but-detroit-has-a-long-road-ahead-11606473031
[https://perma.cc/BM9A-JTZT].
128 See 1978 Plan, supra note 95, at 11,105 (“Reduced aggressiveness of certain vehicles in
vehicle-to-vehicle-crashes would be incorporated into [occupant-protection exploratory
rulemaking].”); see also 1978 PLAN APPENDIX, supra note 98 (describing the rulemaking schedule “to
be determined”). Unsurprisingly, no further action is taken on this exploratory plan in the next two
decades, despite the steady increase in light-truck sales.
129 1978 Plan, supra note 95, at 11,102. NHTSA specifically noted 25,000 light-truck-occupant
fatalities in 1976; just one paragraph later, the agency acknowledged 7,000 pedestrian fatalities that same
year. Id. Those numbers only highlight the contrast between NHTSA’s subsequent efforts to protect
light-truck occupants and its inaction on the 1978 plan’s pedestrian safety goals (described supra).
130 Id.
131 See 1989 GAO REPORT, supra note 83, at 31 tbl.3.1 (listing the standards extended to light
trucks between 1979 and 1989).
132 NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., INITIATIVES TO ADDRESS VEHICLE
COMPATIBILITY 8 (2003) (noting a “strong upward trend” in light-truck-on-car collision fatalities
beginning in 1983).
133 See 1988 STATUS REPORT, supra note 109, at 30-34.
134 NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., SAFETY PROGRAMS FOR LIGHT TRUCKS
AND SPORT UTILITY VEHICLES 2 (1990).
135 NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., DOT HS 808 569, RELATIONSHIP OF
VEHICLE WEIGHT TO FATALITY AND INJURY RISK IN MODEL YEAR 1985-93 PASSENGER CARS
AND LIGHT TRUCKS 1 (1997).
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more, no new rulemaking initiatives were suggested.136 Within ﬁve years, the
agency would be before Senator McCain’s committee, describing the same
issue the same committee had heard back in 1974.137 Despite three decades of
research, NHTSA still had no concrete plans to address compatibility.
As with pedestrian safety, NHTSA spent decades sitting on research and
recommendations with nothing to show for it but a single vague, unfulﬁlled
commitment to “exploratory rulemaking.”138 The aftermath of the hearings,
described in the introduction, ﬁt this now-familiar pattern. NHTSA and
Congress have always been quickest to move to protect drivers from the
negative consequences of their purchases, whether by extending FMVSS
occupant-protection standards to light trucks or mandating stability-control
systems to prevent rollovers.139 But when it comes to the externalities that
automobile buyers’ choices impose on other groups, and the gender and
economic disparities that ensue, regulators have been unable to address the
issue in concrete terms, instead merely calling for research and making
earnest but unfulﬁlled commitments.
D. Making Sense of Maladministration: Our Consumer Protection Obsession
A further examination of NHTSA’s history suggests one factor that can
explain not only why some regulations succeed while others spend decades in
rulemaking purgatory, but why NHTSA has retreated from rulemaking in the
ﬁrst place. Since the passage of the MVSA, NHTSA, the White House, and
Congress have all come to embrace a vision of auto safety that is essentially
one of consumer protection. This vision exalts the interests of automobile
owners in determining where, when, and how to address roadway-safety
concerns, leaving those most threatened by consumers’ choices
unprotected.140 The results speak for themselves. Every one of the forty-one
Safety Standards currently applicable to cars and light trucks address either
crash avoidance (beneﬁtting those both inside and outside the vehicle) or
occupant protection. Not one addresses purely external crash mitigation.
136 NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN.,
OVERVIEW OF VEHICLE
COMPATIBILITY/LTV
ISSUES
(1998),
https://icsw.nhtsa.gov/cars/problems/studies/LTV
[https://perma.cc/Z3SE-MXC5]. That year, a prescient report by NHTSA researchers concluded
that “[c]ontinued growth in the number and weight of light trucks, unless oﬀset by safety
improvements, is likely to increase the hazard in collisions between the trucks and smaller road
users” and noted that reducing light truck weight “is likely to generate signiﬁcant beneﬁts for
pedestrians and car occupants” far beyond any additional risk to truck occupants. NAT’L HIGHWAY
TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 135, at 4.
137 See supra notes 1–10 and accompanying text.
138 See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
139 See supra notes 14–15, 129-31 and accompanying text.
140 Of course, in the crash compatibility context, the victims are often themselves car owners;
here, I distinguish between car owners generally and the purchaser of the specific vehicle being regulated.
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Given the popular association of the MVSA with Nader, the notion that
auto-safety regulation is inﬂuenced by consumer protection may seem
obvious. However, the safety movement that culminated in the MVSA
originated not in consumer protection, but in an epidemiological vision of
roadway safety. Senator Abraham Ribicoﬀ, whose 1965 hearings on auto
safety laid the groundwork for the MVSA months before Nader entered the
national picture, drew primarily on the work of epidemiologist William
Haddon (who would go on to serve as the ﬁrst NHTSA administrator) to
paint roadway safety as a public health concern.141 At the signing ceremony
for the MVSA, President Johnson described roadway fatalities as a “raging
epidemic,” comparable to polio and childhood disease, which the new act will
set out to “cure.”142 And the preamble to the Act itself makes no reference to
consumers; rather, the stated purpose is simply “to reduce traﬃc accidents
and deaths and injuries to persons resulting from traﬃc accidents.”143
The intervention of consumer-protection advocates like Nader into the
extant epidemiological auto-safety approach was indispensable to the passage
of the MVSA.144 But the new activists brought with them a constrained vision
of speciﬁcally consumer interests requiring government intervention.145 In
Unsafe at Any Speed these blind spots were readily apparent. Early in the book,
Nader illustrated the consequences of a transmission defect with grisly
anecdotes of drivers accidentally plowing through crowds of pedestrians and
other bystanders. 146 Tellingly, however, his focus was on how those tragedies
“trap[ped] the driver” and led to criminal prosecutions.147 Any serious
reﬂection on the consequences for non-occupant casualties is entirely absent.
For the Naderite movement, the hapless driver/consumer was the chief victim
of dangerous auto design, and consumerism deﬁned the primary class of
person whose interests required government intervention.148

THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY, supra note 53, at 3, 51-52.
Remarks of the President at Signing of the Highway Safety Act and the Traffic Safety Act (1966) in 1
NATIONAL TRAFFIC AND MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY ACT OF 1966 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 32-33 (1985).
143 National Traﬃc and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718. As
a result, Mashaw and Harfst classiﬁed NHTSA as a “health and safety” agency alongside OSHA
and the EPA. THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY, supra note 53, at 4.
144 THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY, supra note 53, at 53 (describing the publication of
Unsafe at Any Speed as a turning point in the safety movement).
145 This was a problem endemic to the third-wave consumer movement. LIZBETH COHEN, A
CONSUMER’S REPUBLIC 386 (2003) (describing the “blurring of lines” between citizens and
consumers in the third wave).
146 NADER, supra note 84, at 56-57.
147 Id. at 57.
148 COHEN, supra note 145, at 386-87 (noting that “citizen” and “consumer” were used
interchangeably in the third-wave movement and that the movement deﬁned interests within
increasingly granular subconstituencies). Indeed, it was Nader who ﬁrst proposed that the MVSA
141
142
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Following the passage of the MVSA and throughout the 1970s, repeated
Congressional and executive intervention ensured that this consumer-centered
approach would emerge as the dominant vision of auto safety. In 1972, the Motor
Vehicle Information and Savings Act established the five mile-per-hour bumper
standard (a measure intended to lower owners’ repair bills, unrelated to any safety
concern) and the consumer-education program that would eventually become
NCAP.149 The increasingly narrow vision was reflected in the text of the 1972 Act:
NHTSA was required to publish information to consumers on the
“crashworthiness” of specific automobile models, but “crashworthiness” was
defined only as “the protection that a passenger motor vehicle affords its
passengers.”150 Just two years later, Congress, acting in the name of consumers,
finally laid to rest any epidemiological safety approach. The 1974 amendments to
the MVSA were aimed squarely at NHTSA’s recent rule mandating ignition
interlocks, devices that prevented automobiles from starting until the seatbelt had
been fastened.151 At a time when only 25 to 30% of motorists wore seatbelts, the
rule was clearly sound from a public-safety standpoint.152 But when furious drivers
flooded Congress with letters objecting to the mandate,153 Congress responded to
the outcry by repealing the interlock rule, providing consumers the freedom to
purchase “exactly as much safety equipment as they wanted.”154 As if the
consumer-centric message was not clear enough, the 1974 amendments also
dramatically expanded NHTSA’s recall authority by giving motorists the right to
have defects repaired at no cost.155 In the same breath, Congress both roundly
rebuked NHTSA’s epidemiological approach for inconveniencing consumers and
foisted more consumer-protection responsibility on the agency to enforce implied
warranties on behalf of consumers.
As described by historian Lisbeth Cohen, the broader consumer movement
experienced a dramatic philosophical shift in the late 1970s, one that reduced
the common ground between consumer advocates and epidemiologists.
Increasingly, the movement brought a consumer mentality to citizens’
relationship with the government itself—as “customers,” they began to
include the authority to enforce warranties by ordering the recall of defective vehicles. THE
STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY, supra note 53, at 57.
149 Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act, Pub. L. No. 92-513, §§ 102(b), 201, 86
Stat. 947, 949, 956 (1972); see also 49 C.F.R. § 571.215 (1975) (setting the bumper standard at ﬁve
miles per hour).
150 Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act, § 2(14), 86 Stat. at 948 (emphasis added).
151 Motor Vehicle and Schoolbus Safety Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-492, sec. 109,
§ 125(b), 88 Stat. 1470, 1482.
152 THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY, supra note 53, at 85.
153 Id. at 134.
154 Id. at 135.
155 Motor Vehicle and Schoolbus Safety Amendments of 1974, sec. 102, 88 Stat at 1470-77; see
also THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY, supra note 53, at 110 (discussing the impact of this
expanded authority).
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evaluate government programs by the personal benefits they generated.156 The
Ford and Carter administrations embraced this shift, placing increasing
emphasis on preventing “undue” regulatory costs on consumers.157
The most visible product of this shift was the increasing importance of
cost–beneﬁt analyses in NHTSA’s rulemaking initiatives. On the heels of a
1976 DOT-wide policy mandating cost–beneﬁt analyses in all rulemaking, the
Ford administration appointed John W. Snow, a USDOT deputy general
counsel and part-time professor of cost–beneﬁt analyses, as NHTSA
administrator.158 Snow immediately began incorporating cost–beneﬁt
analyses into the agency’s rulemaking process—despite the fact (as safety
advocates in Congress pointed out) that the MVSA in no way mandated that
safety standards generate more safety beneﬁts than costs.159 The cost–beneﬁt
requirement survived through the Carter administration and Snow’s eventual
replacement by Nader protégé Joan Claybrook. Although personally opposed
to cost–beneﬁt analyses, Claybrook placed Snow’s deputy and chief cost–
beneﬁt analyst in charge of all rulemaking activity.160 This requirement
dramatically impacted the pace of rulemaking, creating, according to Mashaw
and Harfst, a “reiterative, . . . ponderous rulemaking process.”161 Indeed,
stringent analysis requirements were a main technique used by succeeding
administrations to delay and defeat rulemaking altogether.162 Notably exempt
from these onerous requirements was NHTSA’s recall program;163 while
costly to the automotive industry, it provided direct beneﬁts to consumers in
the form of free repairs on vehicles they had already purchased.
Beginning in the mid-1970s, NHTSA has been increasingly drawn to
auto-safety solutions that impose the least burden on occupants and owners.
Recalls covered at manufacturer expense, the NCAP consumer information
156 COHEN, supra note 145, at 397 (“[P]oliticians and their customer-voters were quick to reject
what, in their view, yielded an inadequate personal return on their investment . . . .”).
157 Id. at 390, 393 (quoting Carter’s statement that deregulation would ensure consumers get a
“better deal”). Momentum in the Ford administration culminated in President Carter’s executive
order establishing an Oﬃce of Consumer Aﬀairs to ensure that federal agencies responded to
consumers’ demands and complaints. THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY, supra note 53, at 166.
158 THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY, supra note 53, at 189-90.
159 See id. at 191-94 (describing Snow’s strategy for justifying cost–beneﬁt analyses); Command
and Control, supra note 60, at 177 (“Congress made clear that safety was the overriding
consideration. . . . Costs were to be secondary . . . .”).
160 See THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY, supra note 53, at 196-97.
161 Command and Control, supra note 60, at 181.
162 GOLDEN, supra note 75, at 42-44, 46 (describing the use of cost–beneﬁt analyses by
NHTSA under Reagan).
163 Command and Control, supra note 58, at 181. This is particularly surprising given that
NHTSA itself requested that cost–beneﬁt analysis be incorporated into the expanded 1974 recall
authority—a proposal expressly rejected by Congress. THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY, supra
note 53, at 114-15. As noted previously, there is still no evidence establishing any safety beneﬁts from
the recall program. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
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program, and the growing focus on education eﬀorts to modify pedestrian
behavior164 all reﬂect a vision of road safety that centers the interests and
preferences of automobile consumers. When rulemaking did happen, it was
occupant-centric and almost exclusively served the interests of automobile
owners.165 This approach likely privileged whiter, wealthier, and male
interests at the expense of the safety of other road users.
But for all the ﬂuctuations of the consumer movement and shifts in safety
policy, one of the more consequential elevation of consumer interests in auto
safety was one cemented into the MVSA from the start. Although the MVSA
provided for safety standards to ensure “the public is protected against
unreasonable risk,”166 and its rulemaking provision contained no speciﬁc
mention of consumers, drivers, or occupants, it did require that any proposed
standard be “appropriate for the particular type of motor vehicle . . . for
which it is prescribed.”167 Per the Senate report, this innocuous-seeming
caveat was intended to ensure that rulemakers prioritized “aﬀording
consumers [a] wide range of choices” in the market—soon interpreted to
mean that the standards could not be used to “eliminate” any particular type
of vehicle, regardless of how dangerous it was.168
This emphasis on consumer protection came directly at the expense of
NHTSA’s ability to set safety standards to address externalized dangers like
pedestrian safety and crash compatibility. In order to “aﬀord[] consumers [a]
continued wide range of choices,” NHTSA was precluded from setting
standards that might “eliminate” certain categories of vehicles.169 To the
extent the very traits of light trucks that create greater negative externalities
are the same ones that deﬁne the category of vehicle (high ride height and
large mass), NHTSA may struggle to eﬀectively regulate those problems. At
164 See Fred Ranck, Walk Alert: The New National Pedestrian Safety Program, ITE J., Aug. 1989, at
37-38, 40 (describing NHTSA’s new program to “inform[] pedestrians of the measures they can take
to protect themselves” and increase enforcement of pedestrian laws); We Asked NHTSA to Rewrite the
Pedestrian Safety Playbook, AMERICA WALKS (Oct. 28, 2020), https://americawalks.org/we-asked-nhtsato-rewrite-the-pedestrian-safety-playbook [https://perma.cc/9N3A-E8CD] (criticizing NHTSA’s 2020
Pedestrian Safety Playbook for inappropriately focusing on modifying pedestrian behavior).
165 Although the backup-camera requirement inserted in FMVSS 111 by the 2007 Cameron
Gulbransen Kids Transportation Safety Act is nominally focused on non-occupant safety, the
primary impetus was horror stories of SUV drivers running over their own children in the driveway.
Cameron Gulbransen, KIDSANDCARS.ORG, https://www.kidsandcars.org/child_story/cameron-gulbransen
[https://perma.cc/S2W6-G8TY] (recounting the death of Cameron Gulbransen, namesake of the act,
who was killed when his father reversed his SUV over him in the driveway of their home, and
advocating for backup-camera legislation).
166 National Traﬃc and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718
(codiﬁed as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 301).
167 Id. at 80 Stat. at 719.
168 Chrysler Corp. v. Dep’t of Transp., 472 F.2d 659, 679 (6th Cir. 1972) (quoting S. REP. NO.
89-1301 (1966)).
169 Id.
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the same time, the increasing emphasis on recall actions left a large hole for
vehicle designs with no speciﬁc “defects,” but which were nonetheless
disproportionately dangerous. Finally, as NHTSA shifted emphasis from
regulation170 to consumer education through the NCAP program, market
failures created by consumer self-interest in selecting light trucks went
entirely unchecked. Although the consumer-protectionist approach has
undoubtedly improved road safety in some respects, it left an Explorer-sized
blind spot for automobiles that oﬀered improved occupant protection but
greater risks for those outside the vehicle.
IV. THE ROAD AHEAD: AUTO SAFETY AS TRANSPORTATION JUSTICE
Consumer-oriented policies—from a mandate to maintain diversity of
consumer choice, to rigorous rulemaking analysis requirements to minimize
costs to consumers, to the increasing emphasis on consumer education and
recalls over rulemaking—have all worked to frustrate any attempts to regulate
for either pedestrian protection or crash incompatibility. Today, in the face of
the light-truck crisis, it is clear that the ﬁfty-year-old framework through
which Congress and NHTSA have viewed auto safety has never been
adequate to meaningfully address externalized harms. At the same time, the
alarming disparate impacts that these externalized dangers create for women,
low-income communities, and people of color demand urgent intervention to
ensure that our transportation system does not compound existing
inequalities. A new vision of auto safety, grounded in long-standing principles
of transportation justice, is required to empower NHTSA to address the
light-truck crisis. Fortunately, a rich literature from the transportationplanning ﬁeld is available to inform those eﬀorts, and NHTSA’s sister
agencies within USDOT have already implemented these policies to varying
degrees. However, NHTSA may be unable or unwilling to implement this
vision on its own; Congressional intervention, perhaps even to the point of
amending the MVSA, may be necessary.
A. Defining Transportation Justice
Transportation justice aims to answer the normative questions faced by
transportation policymakers, which frequently require diﬃcult trade-oﬀs
among competing interests, by reference to philosophical principles of

170 Except to the extent that the light-truck category created unique risks for owners, as with
rollovers and child back-overs; in such cases, NHTSA and Congress moved swiftly to address them
through rulemaking.
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justice.171 Transportation justice theory covers a diverse body of thought,
including both substantive and procedural theories,172 but holds as a core
principle the equitable distribution of the beneﬁts and burdens of
transportation systems. Whether drawing from John Rawls and Amartya
Sen,173 Ronald Dworkin,174 or Henri Lefebvre,175 transportation justice
theorists generally subscribe to a distributive equity theory that allocates
resources (either concrete resources like funding or abstract concepts like
“accessibility”) in ways that reduce inequality,176 and are roundly critical of
utilitarian principles such as those that seek only to maximize eﬃcient
movement.177 Although these theorists are primarily writing in the context of
transit planning and investment, the principle of equitable distribution of
transportation’s beneﬁts and burdens applies as much to auto safety as it does
to highway design.178 Indeed, transportation justice serves the same objectives
in either context: a segment of the automobile ﬂeet that disproportionately
subjects low-income and minority people to traﬃc violence represents just as

171 See KAREL MARTENS, TRANSPORT JUSTICE: DESIGNING FAIR TRANSPORTATION
SYSTEMS 5-7 (2017) (noting “the inevitable political choices and trade-oﬀs that have to be made in
transportation planning and policy” and arguing that such choices cannot be made “without
reverting to notions of justice and fairness”).
172 Id. at 8, ﬁg. 1.1.
173 Rafael H. M. Pereira, Tim Schwanen & David Banister, Distributive Justice and Equity in
Transportation, 37 TRANSP. REVS. 170, 184-86(2016) (proposing an ethical perspective drawing on
John Rawls’s theory of egalitarianism and Amartya Sen’s “capabilities” approach to achieve fair
distribution of transportation investments).
174 MARTENS, supra note 171, at 13-14.
175 MIMI SHELLER, MOBILITY JUSTICE: THE POLITICS OF MOVEMENT IN AN AGE OF
EXTREMES 36 (2018).
176 See MARTENS, supra note 171, at 14 (advocating for a transportation system that provides
“all persons with a suﬃcient level of accessibility”); Pereira et al., supra note 164, at 184 (“[A]
transport policy is fair if it distributes transport investments and services in ways that reduces
inequality of opportunity.”); SHELLER, supra note 175, at 35 (incorporating distributive justice
among other concepts). Other aspects of these theories do not translate as neatly to the auto-safety
context: Martens, for example, centers the concept of “accessibility” in his vision of transportation
justice—a relevant consideration for infrastructure planning and investment, but less so in the
context of NHTSA’s mission to regulate the vehicles within that system. MARTENS, supra note 171,
at 26-27 (describing Martens’ theory). Likewise, Sheller’s theory of “mobility justice” goes beyond
the scale of national and regional planning to consider mobility in a global context; although an
essential lens, it similarly goes beyond the scope of NHTSA’s mandate. See SHELLER, supra note
175, at 44 (outlining a theory incorporating migration, tourism, and climate justice issues).
177 See SHELLER, supra note 175, at 23-24 (explaining how utility-maximizing approaches
reproduce unequal power structures).
178 Sheller in fact criticizes Pereira’s concept of distributive equity as unduly limited, noting
that distributive justice should not only include the means of transport and access to mobility, but
also “the equitable distribution of the risks . . . and possible harms associated with mobility
infrastructures [including] crashes,” since “poor and vulnerable populations . . . experience . . . the
greatest exposure to harm, injury and death from unjust mobility systems.” Id. at 26 (noting
pedestrian fatalities speciﬁcally).
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much of an inequitable limitation on mobility rights as a municipal
government that underfunds bus routes in poor neighborhoods.
According to transportation justice principles, NHTSA would prioritize
rulemaking initiatives designed to correct the inequitable burdens imposed
by light trucks, even at the expense of beneﬁts like diversity of consumer
choice and owner-occupant protection—beneﬁts that currently ﬂow to more
privileged groups. In many ways, this would represent a complete reversal
from the existing approach: When NHTSA (at Congress’s insistence)
promulgates ESC requirements protecting light-truck consumers from one
of the few negative consequences of their purchase while ignoring crash
compatibility and pedestrian safety, they not only allow the disadvantaged to
continue to bear a disproportionate burden, but actively ensure that the
beneﬁts of auto-safety regulations accrue to wealthier, whiter road users.
Indeed, the cost–beneﬁt analysis, a cornerstone of the consumerist vision, is
often diametrically opposed to distributional justice principles.179
B. Transportation Justice in the Federal Government
The strength of any proposal depends as much on its practical viability as
it does on the moral force of its arguments, and it might be easy to dismiss
this fundamental reorientation of our auto-safety regime along transportation
justice principles as utopianism. This would be a mistake: If anything, this
proposal would harmonize NHTSA’s regulatory approach with those of its
sister agencies within USDOT. As this Section outlines, shades of
transportation justice principles have been gaining momentum within
USDOT for decades, and such a shift at NHTSA would promote a uniﬁed,
equity-oriented approach to federal surface transportation policy.
Distributional equity principles first appeared in USDOT’s 1970
regulations implementing Title VI, which not only prohibit racial
discrimination but require funding recipients to take race-conscious
affirmative action to address prior inequitable distributions of benefits.180
And after President Clinton’s 1994 executive order on environmental justice

179 SHELLER, supra note 175, at 23-24 (noting how cost–beneﬁt analyses in transit planning can
reproduce inequality by valuing the movement eﬃciency of wealthy people more); Daniel Hemel,
Regulation and Redistribution with Lives in the Balance, U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021)
(manuscript at 3-4) (explaining that traditional cost–beneﬁt analyses accord the same weight to a
dollar in the hands of both Jeﬀ Bezos and someone below the poverty line and exploring the
diﬃculties with conducting distributively weighted cost–beneﬁt analyses).
180 49 C.F.R. § 21.5(a), (b)(7) (1970) (“This part does not prohibit the consideration of race
[to remedy discriminatory practices] . . . . Where prior discriminatory practice or usage tends . . .
to deny [individuals] the beneﬁts of [the recipient’s programs, the recipient must] take aﬃrmative
action to remove or overcome the eﬀects . . . .”).
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expanded protections to low-income communities,181 both USDOT and the
Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) and Federal Transit
Administration (FTA) each issued agency orders aimed at addressing
disproportionate burdens on minority and low-income populations.182 In
addition, FTA has promulgated extensive guidelines on reporting
requirements for funding recipients,183 including a requirement to conduct
equity analyses, to ensure that equity goals are met.184 Several
transportation justice scholars have read these intersecting orders and
guidelines as implicitly or explicitly embodying distributional justice
principles.185 And at least one DOT component agency, the FTA, has been
willing to take administrative action under these regulations to enforce
distributive justice principles.186
With the two largest surface transportation operating agencies187 and the
USDOT itself incorporating distributive-justice principles to various degrees,
the dissonance of NHTSA’s regulatory approach is apparent. Not only has

181 Exec. Order No. 12898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 11, 1994). See also Karel Martens & Aaron
Golub, A Fair Distribution of Accessibility: Interpreting Civil Rights Regulations for Regional Transportation
Plans, J. PLAN. EDUC. & RES., Sept. 2018, at 5 (noting that the executive order “eﬀectively expanded
the deﬁnition of ‘protected classes’ of the Civil Rights Act to include low-income populations . . . .”).
182 Richard A. Marcantonio, Aaron Golub, Alex Karner & Louise Nelson, Confronting
Inequality in Metropolitan Regions, 44 FORDHAM URB. L. REV. 1017, 1047-48 (2017). The executive
order itself can be even read to require equitable distribution of beneﬁts and burdens. Martens &
Golub supra note 181 at 5.
183 FED. TRANSIT ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., CIRCULAR 4702.1B, TITLE VI
REQUIREMENTS AND GUIDELINES FOR FEDERAL TRANSIT ADMINISTRATION RECIPIENTS (2012).
184 Id. at ch. VI-1 to VI-2. See TRANSIT COOP. RSCH. PROGRAM, TRANSP. RESEARCH BD., TCRP
RESEARCH REPORT 214, EQUITY ANALYSIS IN REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION PLANNING PROCESSES
4 (2020) (identifying the Title VI Circular as the source of the Equity Analysis requirement).
185 Marcantonio et al., supra note 182, at 1056 (noting that the Title VI and Environmental
Justice requirements “share the same fundamental purpose . . . to ensure that [protected minority
and low-income groups] receive an equitable distribution of beneﬁts without bearing an unfair share
of burdens”); see also Martens & Golub, supra note 181, at 6-7 (analyzing the various agency orders
and guidance documents to extract possible normative standards of distributional justice).
186 Marcantonio et al., supra note 182, at 1053-55 (describing the FTA’s administrative
enforcement action to withdraw federal funding from the San Francisco-area Metropolitan Planning
Organization over its plan that removed transit stops in working-class minority neighborhoods on a
proposed airport shuttle route).
187 U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., TRANSFORMING COMMUNITIES IN THE 21ST CENTURY 4-5
(2017) (listing the budgets of all DOT component agencies; besides the Federal Aviation
Administration, FHWA and FTA have the largest budgets).
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NHTSA never issued its own agency order under Executive Order 12898,188 it
performs only cursory environmental justice analyses on new safety standards.189
Fortunately, however, recent actions by the new Biden administration
suggest an opportunity to reorient auto-safety policy dramatically.
Transportation Secretary Pete Buttigieg has brought considerable attention
to road-safety issues and has consistently highlighted equity as a high
priority for the department.190 More fundamentally, recent actions of the
new administration suggest that cracks may be appearing in the consumerprotection foundation. President Biden recently outlined his plan to
overhaul the cost–benefit analysis process applied by the Office of
Management and Budget to, among other things, “take into account the
distributional consequences of regulation . . . to ensure that regulatory
initiatives appropriately benefit and do not inappropriately burden
disadvantaged, vulnerable, or marginalized communities.”191 Although the
memorandum “reaffirms the basic principles” of past cost–benefit orders,
the explicit discussion of distributional principles clearly sounds in the
register of transportation justice and could provide the groundwork for
more explicit (and thoughtful) incorporation of equity principles in
NHTSA’s rulemaking activities.192

188 Although NHTSA’s rulemaking activities are not covered by Title VI as they do not involve
disbursal of funds, the Executive Order operates as an independent requirement on all federal
agencies. Exec. Order No. 12898, supra note 181, at § 1-101 (charging “each Federal agency” with
addressing disproportionate adverse health burdens created for minority and low-income
populations by the agency’s programs, policies or activities).
189 See, e.g. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., DOT HS 812 347, MINIMUM
SOUND REQUIREMENTS FOR HYBRID AND ELECTRIC VEHICLES: FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL
ASSESSMENT 30 (2016) (providing a short paragraph of environmental justice analysis for FMVSS
141 anticipating no adverse impact on covered populations). Of course, given that NHTSA’s work
is not spatially bounded the way FHWA and FTA are, the Executive Order’s focus on low-income
and minority populations does not map precisely onto an auto-safety regime that operates at a
vehicle systems level. But see supra notes 41–42 and accompanying text (showing that traffic
violence is geographically distributed).
190 Sam Mintz, How Biden is Betting on Buttigieg To Drive a New Era of Racial Equity, POLITICO
(Mar. 8, 2021, 4:30 AM), https://www.politico.com/news/2021/03/08/biden-buttigieg-acial-equity473928 [https://perma.cc/CF9L-3HCS] (“Buttigieg has touched on improving racial equity in
transportation at virtually every television interview.”). But see Alissa Walker, Pete Buttigieg Isn’t a Transit
Visionary. But Biden Might Not Need One, CURBED (Dec. 15, 2020), https://www.curbed.com/2020/12/petebuttigieg-usdot-amtrak-joe biden.htm [https://perma.cc/QYD3-SL3R] (arguing that Buttigieg is not a
“transit visionary”).
191 Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies: Modernizing Regulatory Review,
§2 THE WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 20, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidentialactions/2021/01/20/modernizing-regulatory-review [https://perma.cc/QG9N-PV7Y].
192 But see Hemel, supra note 179, at 6-7 (discussing some diﬃculties with incorporating
distributional principles into cost–beneﬁt analyses).
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C. The Need for Congressional Action
If the apparent priorities of the Biden administration signal a newfound
interest in revisiting long-standing assumptions in transportation policy,
there is still good reason to doubt that executive action alone will be enough
to enshrine a transportation justice vision within NHTSA. Three factors in
particular suggest that securing a meaningful commitment to addressing the
disparities and inequities in auto safety will require Congressional action.
First is the inescapable language in the MVSA that embedded
consumerism into the heart of NHTSA’s mission. Whatever ambiguity that
exists in the statutory requirement that regulations be “appropriate for the
particular type” of vehicle cannot overcome the clear evidence of
Congressional intent that no class of vehicle be prohibited, no matter how
dangerous.193 For NHTSA to have the latitude to embrace transportationjustice principles fully, Congress will have to modify the MVSA so that
consumer choice no longer trumps protection of vulnerable road users.194
Second, the practical reality is that nearly every signiﬁcant rulemaking
undertaken by NHTSA in the past three decades has been done at the
direction or request of Congress.195 Given the agency’s limited resources,196
the demands of the rulemaking process, and the likelihood that Congress will
continue to direct the agency’s rulemaking activities in years to come, any
independent NHTSA rulemaking initiative may be an unacceptably risky
investment of resources; even if the agency begins the process, any
independent transportation-justice-oriented rulemaking could easily be
sidelined if other rulemaking demands are made by Congress.
Third, and perhaps most important, is the fact that since the passage of
the MVSA, Congress has been the most forceful proponent of the consumerprotection approach. From the creation of NCAP, to never-ending
expansions of NHTSA’s recall authority, to the high-profile and
embarrassing legislative overrule of NHTSA’s seatbelt interlock standard,
Congress has repeatedly intervened not only to expand the agency’s
consumer protection mandate but to reject forcefully any alternative vision
See supra notes 157–159 and accompanying text.
This is not to suggest that transportation justice principles would require an outright ban
on light trucks. However, the risk of running afoul of the type-appropriate requirement has, for
example, stymied eﬀorts to incorporate the GTR-9 standard. Telephone Interview with Erika Jones,
Former Special Counsel to the Adm’r, Nat’l Highway Traﬃc Safety Admin. (Oct. 28, 2020) (notes
on ﬁle with author).
195 Command and Control, supra note 60, at 215 (noting “the frequency with which Congress
[has] felt it necessary to set [NHTSA’s] agenda” through agency-forcing statutes such as ISTEA,
and suggesting that the intended message to NHTSA was to “adopt rules only when asked”).
196 NHTSA Oversight: The Road Ahead, Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Com., Trade, &
Consumer Prot., 111th Cong. 9 (2010) (statement of Rep. John Dingell) (noting that NHTSA has
“suﬀered years of stagnation in funding and . . . reduction in personnel levels”).
193
194
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of road safety that could detrimentally affect automobile consumers. In light
of that history, it should be no surprise that NHTSA may not want to act
without express direction from Congress.
As an agency simultaneously “chronically underfunded and overpoliticized,” to borrow the words of a former deputy administrator,197 it is
clear that NHTSA faces signiﬁcant risks should it attempt to steer a new
course without Congressional endorsement. For the promise of
transportation justice in auto safety to be realized, Congress will likely need
to give its full-throated assent.
CONCLUSION
For fifty years, the federal government has attempted to regulate auto
design to promote road safety. But a road-safety vision oriented toward the
interests of consumers has proved woefully inadequate. The consumer-oriented
regime has failed to control for vehicle designs that create disproportionately
large risks for other road users, despite forty years of agency research
establishing the exact disparate dangers that have played out in the current
light-truck crisis. NHTSA’s inaction is made all the more alarming by the
disparate burden these dangers have placed on vulnerable groups.
As this Comment has shown, NHTSA’s inability to meet the current
moment is the result of a deep-seated, structural ﬂaw in our auto-safety
regime. Creating a safer, more equitable transportation system requires a new
approach. Fortunately, a new movement for transportation justice, already
making inroads elsewhere in the Department of Transportation, oﬀers a
ready-made framework for incorporating distributional equity into autodesign regulation. Congress and the Executive should act to bring NHTSA’s
rulemaking in line with transportation justice principles and pump the brakes
on the decades-long safety crisis unfolding on our streets.

197 Myron Levin & Eli Wolfe, In Battle Against “The Highway Disease,” Traffic Safety Agency
Attacked as Asleep at the Wheel, SALON (Dec. 26, 2020, 9:00 AM), https://www.salon.com/2020/12/26/inbattle-against-the-highway-disease-traffic-safety-agency-attacked-as-asleep-at-the-wheel_partner
[https://perma.cc/5WQN-64QW] (quoting David Friedman).

